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DRAINAGE LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA:
AN OVERVIEW*
By ROBERT E. BECK** AND BRUCE E. BOHLMAN***
I. INTRODUCTION
Drainage law operates today in a social, philosophical, and
scientific setting that may posit on the one hand some landowners
seeking to drain every pothole on their land in order to make that
land produce more crops, and on the other hand some people who
wish to preserve every pothole in the effort to maintain the eco-
logical balance that is necessary for man's survival.1
This article does not investigate the social, philosophical, and
scientific questions concerning drainage versus wetlands preserva-
tion. Proceeding on the assumption that a decision to drain has
Part M of this article is part of a study of North Dakota (and regional) water
law sponsored by the Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agricul-
ture. The study was completed June 30, 1968; two previous publications under the study
are Beck & Newgren, Irrigation in North Dakota Through Garrison Diversion: An Insti-
tutional Overview, 44 N.D. L. REv. 465 (1968), and Bard & Beck, An Institutional Over-
view of the North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission: Its Operation and Set-
ting, 46 N.D. L. REv. 31 (1969). The authors have assumed responsibility for bringing the
study up-to-date for this publication. Opinions expressed by the authors are not neces-
sarily those of the United States Department of Agriculture.
The authors wish to express their sincere thanks and appreciation to Mr. Alan K.
Grinberg, Assistant Chief Engineer, North Dakota State Water Commission, for his con-
tribution to this initial study, and to student assistant Dennis Schurman.
** Professor of Law and Director, Agricultural Law Research Program, University
of North Daokta School of Law. LL.B. University of Minnesota; LL.M. New York Uni-
versity.
*** Member, North Dakota Bar. J.D. University of North Dakota.
1. See generally North Dakota Water Commission, North Dakota Interim State Wa-
ter Resources Development Plan Appendix E. (1968) (Stanford Research Institute, The
North Dakota Wetlands Problem).
Many interesting studies apparently could be made in North Dakota. Consider, for
example, the remarks of the court in Barns v. Cass County, 59 N.D. 135, 145, 228 N.W.
839, 844 (1929), rehearing denied (1930):
The history of drainage in this state is illuminating-not because of
fraud or graft but because of misconception as to the value of drainage
installation so far as agricultural lands are concerned. In many instances
the assumed benefits never materialized. This, however, is not fraud. Miscal-
culation or erronous Judgment is not involved. When the statute speaks of
benefits, it means benefits calculated at the time of the construction of the
drain, and the fact that subsequently the drain may prove to be of little or
no value does not warrant the setting aside of the assessments. The fraud
necessary to be proved in this case must be fraud in the inception of the
proceedings or fraud in the apportionment of costs and the assessment of
the benefits.
See also the remarks of Justice Robinson quoted in note 237. infra.
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been made, it surveys the substantive and institutional law as it
now exists in North Dakota in relation to drainage, and attempts
to indicate some of the gaps that exist.
The article contains three major sections: (1) substantive law;
(2) institutional law; and (3) concluding remarks. While the sub-
stantive law section deals with the common law relating to drainage
of diffused surface waters, the institutional law section deals with
the drainage projects and drainage boards under the North Dakota
Century Code. The article does not deal with a relatively new
entity, the water management district,2 which also can undertake
drainage projects. It must be recognized at the outset that,
in some areas of the State, some projects may be handled under
one entity and other projects under a different entity.
I1. SUBSTANTIVE DRAINAGE LAW
A. Definitions and basic rules generally.
Substantive drainage law has related primarily to diffused sur-
face waters, although the laws relating to watercourses and lakes
frequently are relevant. Further, in situations where water flows
in a defined course but not in a "watercourse," many jurisdictions
treat that water as if it were still diffused for drainage purposes,
while others treat it as if it flowed in a watercourse.
4
The classical division of the law relating to diffused surface
waters is: (a) common enemy; (b) natural flow; and (c) reason-
able use.5
The basic idea of the common enemy rule was to treat diffused
surface water as a common enemy and allow each landowner
to deal with it as he saw fit. The basic idea of the natural flow
rule was that the upper landowner had a natural servitude over
the lower landowner's land for natural flow drainage. The reasonable
2. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 61-16 (Supp. 1969). For a brief history of the water manage-
ment district, which dates back to 1935, see Bard & Beck, An Institutional Overview of
the North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission: Its Operation and Setting, 46
N.D. L. REv. 31, 64 (1969).
3. Since watercourses and lakes are also surface waters, it Is preferable to refer to
those waters normally resulting from rain or melting snow, that spread over the ground
with no defined channel or regular course as "diffused" surface waters. This is the defi-
nitional approach adopted in the new multi-volume treatise on water law: 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 52.1 at 302 (Robert E. Clark ed. 1967).
4. See the material cited in the forthcoming chapter on drainage law in Waters and
Water Rights (Robert E. Clark ed.). As to what may constitute a drainway or a water-
course, see Soules v. Northern PaC. Ry., 34 N.D. 7, 39-40, 157 N.W. 823, 833 (1916);
Reichert v. Northern Pac. Ry., 39 N.D. 114, 142-43, 167 N.W. 127, 136 (1917) ; Henderson
v. Hines, 48 N.D. 152, 158-59, 183 N.W. 531, 534 (1921). N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-06
(1960), provides:
A watercourse entitled to the protection of the law is constituted if
there is a sufficient natural and accustomed flow of water to form and main-
tain a distinct and a defined channel. It is not essential that the supply of
water should be continuous or from a perennial living source. It is enough
if the flow arises periodically from natural causes and reaches a plainly de-
fined channel or a permanent character.
5. 1 WATER A2ND WATER RIGHTS § 52.1(A), at 303-08 (Robert E. Clark ed. 1967).
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use test looks to what is a reasonable use of one's land under the
particular circumstances.
B. Jones v. Boeing Co.6
In September of 1967, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided
Jones v. Boeing Co. in which it said, "we adopt the reasonable
use rule as expressed in the New Jersey case of Armstrong v.
Francis Corp.. . ,7 The court interpreted Armstrong to mean
that "[t]he issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness becomes
a question of fact to be determined in each case upon a considera-
tion of all of the relevant circumstances, including such factors
as the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm
which results, the purpose or motive with which the possessor
acted, and all other relevant matter."8 Plaintiff's land had been
damaged from a concentration of diffused surface water resulting
from defendant's construction of a trailer court. Previously the
water, according to one witness, "came off in a long area, possibly
four to five hundred feet long." 9 The finding was that:
The duty was upon the architect-engineer to exercise ordi-
nary care for the protection of any person who foreseeably
and with reasonable certainty may be injured by the failure
to do so. . . .This duty was not met in this case and it was
this failure to exercise ordinary care in the design and su-
pervision of this project, even after being placed on notice
of the danger of resulting flooding, which constituted negli-
gence and unreasonable use on the part of the appellant. 10
The Court made it clear that it believed this was not occasion-
ing a change in North Dakota law:
We believe the rule in the New Jersey case has been well
stated and that it represents not so much a change in policy
by this court as a clarification of the rationale followed in
prior decisions and that the result reached is a similar one.11
C. The pre-Jones v. Boeing Co. cases.
The earliest North Dakota case, Carroll v. Rye Township, 2
decided in 1904, is one of several in North Dakota history's involving
6. Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967), 44 N.D. L. Rev. 567 (1968).
7. Id at 904. Armstrong v Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4, 10 (1956).
8. 153 N.W.2d 897, 904 (N.D. 1967).
9. Id. at 902.
10. Id. at 904.
11. Id.
12. Carroll v. Rye Township, 13 N.D. 458, 101 N.W. 894 (1904). For a territorial
predecessor of Carroll, ae Hannaher v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 5 Dak. 1, 37 N.W. 717
(1888).
18. See also, Davenport Township v. Leonard Township, 22 N.D. 152, 193 N.W. 56
(1911) (injunctive relief denied, ordinary highway improvements made without negli-
gence).
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actions against a township for damages allegedly resulting from
flooding because of drains, ditches, roads, and dikes built and
maintained by the township. In this case the North Dakota Supreme
Court adopted Farnham's thesis concerning the scope of the natural
flow rule, holding that it was applicable only where the flow of
diffused surface water had reached a "definite channel."' 14 Since
the water here had not reached a definite channel, it was then
unnecessary to decide whether the common enemy or natural flow
rule applied. Since there was no negligence or malicious conduct
involved, the township was held not responsible. The responsibility
of townships was changed by statute in 1945:15 "It is the intention
of this act that in the construction of highways as herein provided,
the natural flow and drainage of surface waters shall not be ob-
structed. . . ." In 1952 in Viestenz v. Arthur Township,16 the
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a denial of injunctive relief
to complainant, saying that this code provision imposed a mandatory,
duty. This mandatory duty approach was reaffirmed in 1965.7
Thus the thrust of the drainage obligation of townships and other
agencies as to road building and maintenance now has to be looked
upon as statutory, rather than involving the common law approach.
However, much of what the court said in the earlier cases may
be applicable to other drainage problems. In Carroll, counsel had
made the argument that:
rElven though the surface water has not been diverted
from a definite channel, or carried by artificial ditches
through a natural watershed, yet the defendant should have
so constructed its road that the surface water would not have
flowed upon the premises in greater quantities, or in a differ-
ent manner, from what it naturally was wont to flow, and
that if, by the construction of its embankments, ditches, and
culverts, though constructed in the usual and ordinary man-
ner, larger quantities of surface water were permitted to
accumulate, and were discharged upon plaintiff's land in an
unusual manner, whereby they sustained injury, the defend-
ant was liable in an action for damages for such injury.16
But he lost on the law.
14. 13 N.D. 458, 465, 101 N.W. 894, 896 (1904). See 3 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER
RIOHTS § 889a, at 2587 (1904).
15. N.D. RIv. CODE of 1943, § 24-0633 (1949 Supp.). It became § 24-0306 in 1958. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 24-03-06 (1970).
16. Viestenz v. Arthur Township, 78 N.D. 1029, 54 N.W.2d 572 (1952), two justices
dissenting on the basis that the trial court's evaluation of the facts should have been
affirmed. For a later case in this matter, see Viestenz v. Arthur Township, 129 N.W.2d
33 (N.D. 1964), granting plaintiffs "an order enforcing the said mandatory injunction.
.." Id. at 40.
17. Rynestad v. Clemetson, 183 N.W.2d 559 (N.D. 1965). See also Lemer v. Icoble, 86
N.W.2d 44 (N.D. 1957) and Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1957).
18. 13 N.D. 468, 465, 101 N.W. 894, 896 (1904).
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State v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 19 Soules v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 20 Reichert v. Northern Pac. Ry., 21 Boulger v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 22 Henderson v. Hines,28 and Roder v. Krom, 24 involved
alleged obstructions to streams or other natural drainways. In three
cases, State, Soules, and Reichert, the plaintiffs prevailed in whole
or in part.25 In two cases, Boulger and Roder, no causal effect
between the obstruction and the flooding was shown, so defendants
prevailed. In one case, Henderson, a verdict for plaintiff was re-
versed and a new trial was granted the defendant on negligence
issues. Further, State allowed a Board of Drain Commissioners
the use of mandamus to compel removal of unreasonable obstruc-
tions. What seemed to be the principle of these cases, prior to
Henderson, was that natural drainways were to be kept open, and
one who interfered therewith had a duty to provide a natural
passage for all water that might reasonably be anticipated to drain
there. This then gave rise to the frequent question whether there
was an "extraordinary flood."26  This was also true, the court
said in Soules, under both the natural flow and the common enemy
rules. But the whole point, at least of Farnham's study,27  was
that the natural flow rule applied only where there was a natural
drainway. In other words, there was a servitude for a natural
drainway, but none where there was no natural drainway. Then
came Henderson, in which the court purported to reject the natural
flow rule for natural drainways that do not constitute watercourses,
saying, instead, that the matter Was one of using one's property
so as not to interfere unreasonably with property of another. But
19. State v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 28 N.D. 621, 150 N.W. 463 (1914), on
rehearing (1915).
20 Soules v. Northern Pac. Ry., 34 N.D. 7, 157 N.W. 823 (1915).
21. Reichert v. Northern Pa. Ry., 39 N.D. 114, 167 N.W. 127 (1917), two justices dis-
senting on the basis that the evidence required a finding of extraordinary storm and
flooding.
22. Boulger v. Northern Pac. Ry., 41 N.D. 316, 171 N.W. 632 (1918).
23. Henderson v. Hines, 48 N.D. 152, 183 N.W. 531 (1921), one Judge concurring spe-
cially and two justices dissenting.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-07 (1960)
If any person, municipality, or corporation, without authority of law,
willfully obstructs any ditch, drain, or watercourse, or diverts the water
therein from its natural or artificial course, such person or corporation shall
be liable to the party suffering injury from such obstruction or diversion for
the full amount of the injury occasioned thereby, and in addition thereto,
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than
one hundred dollars, or in lieu thereof, the offending party, if not a corpora-
tion, may be imprisoned in the county jail for a period of not more than
three months.
24. Roder v. Krom, 150 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1967). See also McHenry County v. Brady,
37 N.D. 59, 163 N.W. 540 (1917), involving a Canadian-North Dakota problem.
25. In State, the judgment was reversed but with an order that judgment be entered
on the modified basis approved by the Supreme Court. 28 N.D. 621, 649, 150 N.W. 463,
470 (1914).
26. And the burden on this issue is on the defendants. See 34 N.D. 27, 157 N.W. 828,
828, 830 ("unusual and extraordinary") (1916). 89 N.D. 114, 141-42, 167 N.W. 127,
135-36 (1917).
27. See generaUy/ 3 FARNHAM, WATERs AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 889, 889a, 889b, 889c,
889d (1904).
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negligence in the construction of a culvert in a natural drainway
may constitute such interference. And the earlier North Dakota
cases are relevant on this point. So the question is whether there
was any change in result, or one merely of focus or emphasis.
And so after Henderson, the rule in obstruction cases seemed to
be, for all except watercourses, the rule of reason as expressed
in the sic utere maxim (use your property so as not to injure
another's property). The Henderson approach was seemingly reaf-
firmed in 1967 in Roder, involving a drainway that had been sub-
stituted by agreement for a natural drainway.
But so far, except for Carroll, the cases have dealt essentially
only with obstructing flow. In Froemke v. Parker,2 plaintiff sued
to enjoin defendant from draining a slough through a natural drain-
way over plaintiff's land, and he prevailed. The slough which had
existed for 35 years was not now "diffused surface water," even
though it may have been formed from diffused surface water. It
was of no concern to the court how difficult it might otherwise
be to dispose of the water or whether there was any negligent
construction and so on. This approach was reaffirmed and extended
in Rynestad v. Clemetson29 in 1965, the court saying that an upper
landowner had no right to increase materially the quantity or the
volume of surface water discharged on the lower estate, or to dis-
charge it in a different manner than it usually or ordinarily would
have gone in the natural course of discharge. In Rynestad the
court said: "The owner of the lower, or servient, estate must
receive surface water from the upper, or dominant, estate, in its
natural flow." It is not entirely clear what the court meant. Did
"surface water" refer to surface water in natural watercourses?
To surface water not in a natural drainway or watercourse? To
surface water in natural drainways or watercourses? Since 1904
the court had rejected any such natural flow rule regarding
surface water not in a natural drainway or watercourse. And since
1921, with respect to surface water in natural drainways and water-
courses, it seemingly had replaced the natural flow rule by a
rule of reason. Anyway, the foregoing quoted statement was not
necessary to the decision of this case. For the case seemingly
involved surface waters that, but for the ditching, would not have
reached the natural drainway that overflowed and caused the dam-
age. Otherwise these waters would have evaporated, been absorbed
into the soil, or flowed into potholes or sloughs on plaintiff's land.
The principle followed is that, essentially, the natural drainway
had been surcharged and made to exceed its natural capacity,
28. Froemke v. Parker, 41 N.D. 408, 171 N.W. 284 (1919). (For an earlier issue on
appeal, see Froemke v. Parker, 39 N.D. 628, 169 N.W. 80 (1918).
29. 133 N.W.2d 559, 563 (N.D. 1965).
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and this cannot be done to the injury of another. Injunctive relief
was granted. Recovery of damages, seemingly on a similar basis,
had been allowed earlier in Campbell v. Russell,"° although the
facts are not entirely clear. Recovery was denied plaintiff in Lemer
v. Koble,41 on the basis that the evidence did not show that de-
fendant's draining of a pothole in any way injured the plaintiff.
D. Critique of North Dakota law.
Generally a landowner must so use, or not use, his land as
not to unreasonably interfere with or injure that of another. This
is the basic sic utere or nuisance principle.3 2 Nuisance actions
may be based on either negligent or intentional conduct. The facts
that give rise to a nuisance may also give rise to trespass. The
question for North Dakota, as for other States, is whether anything
more than this basic principle concerning land use governs drainage
problems. The answer given generally in Jones is "No, that is
it."
There are two aspects to the problem. In one case, "X" drains
his water onto someone else's land. In the second case, "X" uses
his land in such a way as to impede the flow of water from some-
one else's land. Are these two instances to be treated the same?
In 1904, in Carroll, the court took the view that disposition of
diffused surface waters was not subject to any rule other than
the basic sic utere rule and that collection and discharge of such
waters would not constitute per se unreasonable conduct. In 1919,
in Froemke, however, in dealing with disposition of slough or pothole
waters, and as such no longer considered by the court as diffused
water, the court seemed to develop a rule that such disposition
could not be made under any circumstances where there was dam-
age to someone else. Perhaps one could harmonize this case with
Carroll by saying that such conduct is per se unreasonable. In
Froemke, the water was drained into a natural drainway; if it is
unreasonable to drain slough water into a drainway it, a fortiorari,
would be unreasonable to cast it where there was no drainway.
The Froemke decision was extended in 1965, in Rynestad, to cover
diffused surface water that would not have reached the natural
drainway but would have emptied into potholes or sloughs. Jones
involved diffused surface water that would have drained onto plain-
tiff's land naturally, although not into a drainway. This water
the defendant collected and discharged, and it is to this fact situation
that the court applies the rule of reason, the rule originally sug-
gested in Carroll. The question remains whether the Froemke and
30. Campbell v. Russell, 132 N.W.2d 705 (N.D. 1965).
31. 86 N.W.2d 44 (N.D. 1957).
32. For a general discussion of nuisance, see W. PsosSrR, ToRTs 592-633 (3d ed. 1964).
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Rynestad fact situations will continue to have their own special
rule--whether the court will say that only the rule of reason
is to apply in that fact situation, and the conduct is per se unrea-
sonable or is not per se unreasonable. It seems clear that had
the Froemke and Rynestad rules been applied to the Jones facts,
a defendant would have no chance of avoiding enjoinment once
it was shown that his conduct contributed to the injury; the Jones
approach gives him a chance.
While the early cases dealing with obstructions placed in natural
drainways other than watercourses seemed to hold that upper land-
owners had a natural flow servitude through these drainways, the
court in Henderson, in 1921, brought this area into line with the
sic utere approach rejecting any automatic natural flow servitude.
According to the Jones court, the rule of reason gives "flex-
bility"; but, likewise, it gives uncertainty. The client says to
the lawyer: "Can I drain?" The lawyer says: "Well it depends
on the circumstances." The client says: "Here are the circum-
stances." The lawyer says, "But I do not know how a jury or
a court will weigh those circumstances." The client insists: "Can
I drain?"
However, the uncertainty criticism is also true of the other
extant approaches to drainage problems.33 Where the common enemy
or natural flow theory is followed, each is so riddled with exceptions
that they are little clearer than a "reasonable use" test and of
course each of these exceptions had been decided on an ad hoc
basis.
What affirmative solution can the client seek? (a) He might
be able to reach an agreement with all who might be affected.
(b) He might establish a legal drain. (c) He might get a declaratory
judgment. (d) He might take the risk of litigation and adverse
decision.
There are, however, some "knowns" that can be taken into
account under the "rule of reason" approach. The first question
to ask is whether defendant's actions have contributed to plaintiff's
injury or threatened injury. If not, there is no cause of action.
If they have contributed, then further questions may be asked.
33. See the forthcoming Chapter on Drainage Law, prepared by Professor Beck, in
WATMR AD WATEU Rionrs (Robert E. Clark ed.), for a thorough, recent discussion of
drainage law in the United States.
There are statutory restrictions on private drainage too. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-15-08 (Supp. 1969):
Any person without written consent of the state engineer who shall drain
or cause to be drained, or who shall attempt to drain any lake or pond
which shall have been meandered and its metes and bounds established by
the government of the United States in the survey of public lands, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
county Jail for not more than ninety days, or by a fine of not more than five
hundreds dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
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Was there a reasonable necessity for the person draining to alter
the drainage in order to be able to make use of his land? Was the
construction of the alteration done in a reasonable manner? Does
the utility of the conduct of the person draining reasonably out-
weigh the gravity of the harm to others? These are the basic
questions that have to be considered in any drainage case in North
Dakota henceforth.
III. INSTITUTIONAL DRAINAGE LAW
A. DRAINAGE PROJECTS, DRAINAGE DISTRICTS, AND THE
COUNTY BOARD OF DRAIN COMMISSIONERS
1. CURRENT STATUS AND PRACTICE
a. Introduction
Part III of this article will set forth the steps necessary to
establish, maintain, and dissolve a drainage district. While the
North Dakota Century Code makes no clear distinction between
a drainage district and a drainage project,34 it is reasonable to
conclude that a drainage district comprises the lands within a
county that are benefited by a drainage project.35 Moreover, al-
though this part of the article will discuss the establishment of
a drainage district under the direction of the county Board of
Drain Commissioners, a drainage project can be handled by other
means.3 6 These alternative means are important insofar as they
raise a substantial issue regarding the necessity of continuing the
system of county drain boards in light of the duplication of functions
now encountered between the county drain boards and, particularly,
the water management districts.
87
The North Dakota statutes define a drain as including any
natural watercourse, opened or to be opened and improved, for
34. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-10 (1960) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-65
(Supp. 1969).
35. see N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-10 (1960). If It can be argued that the legislature
intended that the entire county be considered as a single drainage district, such an in-
tent is made highly improbable by N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-56 (Supp. 1969). Section
61-21-65 provides a procedure whereby one or more drainage districts within the county
may be merged with a water management district organized under N.D. CENT. CODE
ch. 61-16 (1960). The number of drainage districts within any county, therefore, should
be equivalent to the number of drains established by the Board of Drain Commissioners.
This conclusion is also sustained by comments made by Mr. Henry Shane, Chairman of
the Grand Forks County Board of Drain Commissioners, to Bruce Bohiman in a personal
interview conducted on June 7, 1968 (hereinafter referred to and cited as the Shane in-
terview).
36. The most notable of the alternative means is contained in N.D. CENT. CODE ch.
61-16 (1960), dealing with the establishment and operation of a water management dis-
trict. The role of water management districts in the drainage function will be discussed
at a later point in this paper. Another alternative, albeit more difficult to obtain and
broader in scope than drainage, is assistance from the Federal Government under the
Watershed Protection and Flood Conservation Act, 68 Stat. 666 (1954), a& amended, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1009 (1964). 'This act will also be discussed at a later point.
87. The water management districts have all powers 
" . . . conferred by statutes upon
a board of county drain commissioners. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-16-11 (11) (Supp.
1969).
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drainage purposes, and artificial drains of all kinds ". . . including
dikes and appurtenant works. . . ."3 Projects for draining slough
and other low lands may be established under the police power
of the State when such draining is "... conducive to the public
health, convenience, or welfare."39
b. The Board of Drain Commissioners
Within each county, a board of three drain commissioners,
appointed by the Board of County Commissioners,4 0 is authorized
to carry out drainage projects. The Board of Drain Commissioners
(hereinafter referred to as the "Board") may be appointed by
a majority vote of the Board of County Commissioners either on
the commissioners' own motion or in response to the petition of
an interested person. 41 Board members are appointed to staggered
three year terms.
4 2
To qualify for the Board, one must be a resident of the county 3
and cannot hold any other state or county office except that of
a commissioner of a water management district." As a protection
against conflict of interests, a Board member is disqualified from
acting as a Board member in those matters in which he has
a personal or financial interest.45 In the event of such disqualifi-
cation, an alternate commissioner is appointed by the county com-
missioners to act, but only in those matters in which the disquali-
fied member is precluded from acting.4 6  The Board of County
38 .N.D. CENT. CODE 9 61-21-01 (1) (1960).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-21-02, 61-21-10 (1960).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-03 (Supp. 1969). In the absence of a board of drain
commissioners, the board of county commissioners would presumably fulfill the same
function. The appointment of a board of drain commissioners is not mandatory.
In Walstad v. Dawson, 64 N.D. 333, 252 N.W. 64, 66-67 (1934) the court stated
that a county drain board " . . . is a quasi corporation-a department of the county....
It is an agency of the state through which the state itself functions."
Moreover, the board is not capable of being sued in contract for the payment of
drain obligations. Reed v. Beglie, 19 N.D. 801, 124 N.W. 1127 (1910). Nor can they be
sued for failure to maintain a drain. 1942 Op. N.D. ATT'Y. GEN. 46. Mandamus would be
the proper remedy to bring in such instances.
As of 1970 there were Drain Boards in Barnes, Cass, Eddy, Grand Forks, Sargent
Stutsman, and Traill Counties. Formerly existing Boards have been combined with Water
Management Districts in Bottineau, LaMoure, Pembina, Richland and Walsh Counties.
Records of the North Dakota State Water Commission.
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-03 (Supp. 1969).
42. Id. The terms of the commissioners are staggered so that one member's term shall
expire every year.
43. Id.
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-04 (Supp. 1969). The statute would preclude a drain
commissioner from holding the office of a county commissioner. But the statutory pro-
hibition would not seem to prevent the county commissioners from fulfilling the functions
of a drain board in the absence of a drain board in the county. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-03
(1960) implies that the county commissioners are not obligated to appoint a drain board,
but may do so upon their own motion or on the petition of any interested person. The
legislature surely did not intend the statute to prevent the county commissioners from
carrying out the same duties that they can delegate to others. Moreover, if there is no
drain board, § 61-21-04 has nothing upon which to operate.
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-04 (Supp. 1969). In State v. Fisk, 15 N.D. 219, 107 N.W.
191 (1906), the court considered the situation of a commissioner that owned land to be
benefited by the drain.
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-04 (Supp. 1969). Apparently, the statute also allows an
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Commissioners may remove any or all Board members and must
appoint successors to those members who have been removed or
whose terms have expired.
4 7
Once the Board has been appointed, the individual members
must file with the county auditor, within ten days, an oath to
faithfully perform their duties, and, concurrently, execute and
file in the same office a bond in the amount of two thousand
dollars .
48
When all members have qualified for office, a chairman must
be elected by the members of the Board. The chairman thus elected
serves in such capacity for one year.4 9 Business may then be
transacted;5 0 two members of the Board constitute a quorum for
such purposes.51 Thereafter,the Board must make an annual report
to the county commissioners. The report must cover all drains,
in whatever stage of construction, with a detailed accounting of
all funds handled during the year.52
c. Establishment of a Drain.
1) Petition. The first step in establishing a drain is the
submission of a written petition to the Board.5 The petition must
state the starting and ending points of the proposed drain and
the general course it will take.5 4 If the proposed drain is to be
built within a city, the petition must be signed by a ". . . sufficient
number of the property owners of such city . . . to satisfy the
board that there is a public demand for such drain."5 5 Specifically,
"[t]he petition shall be signed by at least six property owners
or a majority of the landowners within proposed district whose
property will be drained by the proposed drain."5 8  (Emphasis
added)
alternative commissioner to act if a member, not disqualified by a conflict of interests,
will nevertheless be unable to act because of his absence from an entire meeting.
47. N.D. CENT. COnE § 61-21-03 (Supp. 1969). There Is no requirement In the statute
that a Board member be removed only for cause.
48. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-07 (1960).
49. Id.
50. In the case of Lee v. Thorenson, 65 N.W.2d 675, 679 (N.D. 1954), the North Da-
kota Supreme Court held that Board members were duly qualified even though the oath
and bond had not been filed within ten days as required by the statute as long as no
function of the office had yet been performed. The court stated that it was essential,
however, that the oath and bond be properly filed before any business is transacted by
the Board.
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-07 (1960).
52. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-06 (1960). A Board member is liable on his bond for any
misapplication of funds handled by him as a Board member.
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-10 (1960).
54. Id.
55. Id. In the case of Stoltze v. Sheridan, 28 N.D. 194, 148 N.W. 1 (1914), the court
held that a petition signed by 10 city property owners out of a total of 223 property own-
ers was insufficient to show a public demand for a drain.
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-10 (1960). An ambiguity arises In the statute In that if
the proposed drain Is to be constructed in a city, property owners in sufficient numbers
to show a public demand must sign the petition. What a "sufficient number" constitutes
is not clear. Perhaps the next sentence of the statute, stating that the petition must be
482 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
2) Bond. It is the Board's duty to require the petitioners
to file a bond with the petition.5 7 If the petition is denied, the
proceeds of the bond are used to pay the administrative expenses
of the Board and the cost of surveys.58
3) Inspection. The Board has a personal duty to inspect
the line of the proposed drain after receipt of the petition and,
if it considers that further proceedings are justified, a resolution
is so adopted and the services of a surveyor or engineer are
engaged to perform the technical services needed. 59
4) Documents. After adoption of the resolution authorizing
further proceedings, the engineer or surveyor prepares the follow-
ing documents: 80
(a) profiles of the area;
(b) specifications of the proposed drain;
(c) cost estimates in sufficient detail to allow the Board
to determine the probable share to be assessed
against each landowner to be benefited by the pro-
posed drain; and
(d) a map or plan of the lands (showing the regular
subdivisions) to be drained.61
signed by at least six property owners or a majority of landowners within the proposed
drainage district, is meant to Imply that at least six property owners must sign if the
drain is to be located in a city (obtaining the signature of a majority of the landowners
might be a burdensome requirement) and, If the drain is to be built on agricultural land,
a majority of the owners must petition (this would be a reasonable requirement in view
of the relatively fewer number of owners involved.) The statute, however, does not make
this distinction, and one can only surmise as to the legislature's Intent.
As a practical matter, at least in Grand Forks County, the Board requires that
the petition be signed by at least six property owners, regardless of the drain's proposed
location. Shane interview, supra note 35. It Is likely that in sparsely populated counties,
a petition could be signed by less than six agricultural landowners and still represent a
majority of the landowners in the proposed drainage district In the case of State v.
Morrison, 24 N.D. 568, 140 N.W. 707 (1913), the court held that if the drain affected
more than one township, the petition must be signed by persons from each of the town-
ships involved. Before the Board acquires jurisdiction to levy an assessment on a town-
ship, therefore, the petition must first be signed by representatives from each of the town-
ships to be assessed.
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-11 (1960).
58. Id. One Board requires that the bond be in the amount of $80.00 for each mile the
proposed drain is to run. This amount has been found to adequately cover all expenses
of the Board in surveying the route of the drain and In conducting the various hearings
and meetings involved. Shane interview, supra note 35. It was learned at the Interview,
however, that the cost to the Board of surveying and other site investigation is negligible,
since the surveying and other technical services of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service are
available for this purpose and no charge for that agency's services Is made under the
provisions of 16 U.S.C. § 590(a) (1964). Whether the $80.00 per mile bond requirement
is reasonable in view of Federal assistance is beyond the scope of this paper.
59. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-12 (1960). The practice of the Grand Forks County Board
is to use the services of the U. S. Soil Conservation Service for surveying, designing, and
estimating the cost of the proposed drain. Shane interview, supra note 35. It appears that
such services could also be obtained from the North Dakota State Water Commission.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-14(1) (Sup'p. 1969).
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-12 (1960).
61. Id. If the Board determines (presumably through the advice of the engineer) that
the original routing of the drain as contained in the petition is not the best location, the
line of the drain may be changed by the Board. They may also extend the location of
the outlet as originally set forth in the petition If the length of the line does not give
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The above documents are then submitted to the Board in the
form of a report.
5) Hearing Set. After receipt of the engineer's or survey-
or's report, the Board must fix a date and place for a public
hearing on the petition.6 2 No later than ten days before the hearing,
the Board must determine and file with the County Auditor a
list containing the description of each parcel of land benefited
by the proposed drain, the percentage assessment of the cost to
be made against each parcel, and the approximate assessment
in dollars as obtained by multiplying the total estimated cost of
establishing the drain by the percentage assessment."3
6) Notice. Notice of the hearing must be published by
the Board in the official county newspaper at least once no later
than ten days before the hearing is to be held. 4 Moreover, the
Board must conduct a search of the records in the Register of
Deeds office to determine the name of the owner of each affected
parcel of land, and mail such record owner a notice of the hearing. 5
An affidavit of mailing must be completed by the person mailing
the notices and filed with the County Auditor.66
The notice of public hearing must contain the following infor-
mation: 6
7
(a) a notice of filing with the County Auditor of the list
of affected parcels and proposed assessments;
(b) a copy of the petition;
(c) the time and place of the hearing;
(d) the beginning and ending points and the course of
enough fall to sufficiently drain the lands affected. These changes, If made, should be
indicated on the engineer's or surveyor's map or plan, and such map or plan must then
be filed In the County Auditor's office for public inspection.
If necessary, the drain may be routed along or across a public road or highway to
the extent that no damage will be done to said road or highway. If it is necessary to
run the drain across a road or highway, the State, county, or township agencW respon-
sible for maintenance of the road or highway must make and keep in repair any neces-
sary culverts or bridges. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-31 (1960).
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that the failure of the surveyor to file
his report with the County Auditor was not such an irregularity in the proceedings as
to preclude establishment of the drain, without any accompanying proof of actual preju-
dice. Edwards v. Cass County, 23 N.D. 555, 137 N.W. 580 (1912).
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-13 (Supp. 1969). The public hearing must be held in a
place that is in the vicinity of the proposed drain and convenient for a majority of land-
owners affected by the proposed drain.
63. Id. It would, of course, be impossible to fix an exact figure at this time, since the
Board thus far has only a cost estimate from the engineer or surveyor from which to
work.
64. Id.
65. Id. The statute does not specify how far in advance such individual notices must
be mailed. Besides being sent to owners whose lands may be assessed, notices must also
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the drain as finally determined by the engineer and
the Board; 68 and
(e) the time and place for filing votes for and against
the drain.6 9
7) The Hearing. When the hearing time arrives, the Board
must have a prepared list of affected landowners 70 for the purpose
of limiting voting rights to those listed.71 Any affected landowner
may appear at the hearing, register his votes, express his opinion
regarding the proposed drain, and offer any evidence relative there-
to. 7
2
The Board must inform those present of the estimated total
cost of the drain, and specify the share that each landowner will
be assessed or the amount of his land that will be condemned, as
the case may be. 73 Moreover, the Board must set a time, not less
than ten days after the hearing, to file any votes for or against
the drain that were not filed with the Board at the hearing.
7 4
8) Voting. In an attempt to equalize liability for the cost
of the proposed drain and the right to object to its construction,
a weighted vote is used. A landowner is permitted to register one
vote for every dollar of the proposed assessment against him,
or one vote for each dollar of the assessed valuation of his land
that is to be condemned for right-of-way purposes.
7 5
68. See Froemke v. Parker, 41 N.D. 408, 171 N.W. 284 (1919).
69. The board may not allow less than 10 days from the date of hearing for votes to be
filed, N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-13 (Supp. 1969). For convenience, the Board must in-
clude a form of ballot to be used for registering votes.
70. An "affected landowner" is defined as one whose land Is subject to assessment or
condemnation. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-01(5) (Supp. 1969).
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-14 (Supp. 1969). Moreover, the Board must make a rec-
ord of affected landowners present at the hearing.
72. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-13 (Supp. 1969).
73. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-14. (Supp. 1969).
74. Id.
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-16 (Supp. 1969). The weighted voting method has not
been used until recently. Under N.D. REv. CODE of 1943 § 61-2115 (1944), for example,
the statute provided:
If a majority of the landowners whose land is subject to assessment for
the construction of the proposed drain petition the board to have further
proceedings discontinued, the board, by resolution, shall order further pro-
ceedings discontinued.
In 1945, the North Dakota Attorney General rendered an opinion which stated that
the Phrase, "majority of landowners," could not be construed to mean majority of acres
benefited rather than majority of persons benefited. The Attorney General recognized
that Irrigation districts conducted voting on the basis of acres, rather than persons, in
order to obtain a fair relation of voting rights to liability [See N.D. PEV. CODE of 1948
§ 61-0503 (1944)], but that the legislature had apparently not provided similar voting
rights for drainage districts. The Attorney General went on to state that "[il]t may be
that an amendment of section 61-2115 would be advisable. That, however, is a matter
which the legislature must determine." 1945 Op. N.D. ATT'Y GEN. 74, 75.
The statute was amended by N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 349 (1949) to provide for 1
vote for every landowner plus 1 vote for every $100.00 In assessment. Later amendments
(N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 383, § 1 (1961); N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 448, § 5 (1965)), further in-
creased voting rights to their present form in N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-16 (Supp. 1969).
The North Dakota Attorney General has also advised that, under a land sale con-
tract, the purchaser, rather than the seller, is entitled to vote as owner. The Attorney
General reqommended, however, that the notice of hearing on the petition for establish-
ment of the drain be mailed to the seller, as legal owner, as well as to the buyer, as
equitable owner. 1952 OP. N.D. ATVY GEN. 55, 56.
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The ballot sent with the notice of hearing is not an exclusive
means of registering votes.76 Also acceptable is a telegram or
any other form of writing sufficient to indicate the voter's intent
to approve or disapprove establishment of the drain. 7 After the
date set by the Board for filing of votes, however, no more votes
will be counted and no voter may withdraw his vote after such
date.7 1 If a voter wishes to withdraw his vote before the deadline,
he may do so but only in writing. 79
9) Decision. After the date set for recording votes has
passed, the Board must immediately count the votes and, if fifty
percent or more of the votes so cast are against establishing the
drain, a resolution must be adopted by the Board discontinuing
the proceedings and denying the petition.80 If more than fifty percent
of the votes filed indicate approval, and the Board determines
that the project will not cost more than the anticipated benefits
of the drain, the Board must prepare an order establishing the
drain.8 ' The Board must then publish a notice of the order establish-
ing or denying the drain in a newspaper of general circulation
in the county.8 2 The notice must contain a copy of the order
and a statement to the effect that the affected landowners' rights
to appeal the order to the district court will expire thirty days
after the date of publication in the newspaper.8 s
10) Appeal. Even if an affected landowner makes a timely
appeal from the order of the Board, the jurisdiction of the district
court may well be limited to determining the following questions:84
76. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-13 (Supp. 1969) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-15 (Supp.
1969).
77. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-14 (Supp. 1969). An agent may cast the votes, if he has
a written power of attorney. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-16 (Supp. 1969).
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-14 (Supp. 1969).
79. Id.
80. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-15 (Supp. 1969). If the petition is denied, the peti-
tioners are liable on their bond, or the Board may proceed against the petitioners jointly
and severally for the costs and expenses of the proceedings. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-15
(Supp. 1969).
81. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-15 (Supp. 1969). The order must accurately describe the
drain and indicate a name by which it can be recorded and indexed.
82. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-17 (1960).
83. Id; N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-18 (Supp. 1969).
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-18 (Supp. 1969). The power of the courts to review the
Board's actions has always been quite restricted. The early case of Erickson v. Cass
County, 11 N.D. 494, 92 N.W. 841 (1902), held that the courts had no power to review
the questions of whether specific lands were benefited by the drain or whether assess-
able lands were omitted from the assessment.
In State v. Fisk, 15 N.D. 219, 107 N.W. 191 (1906), the court stated that the
Board, by assessing benefits, functioned In a judicial capacity but that its decision was
final in the absence of fraud, if the assessment was made in strict accordance with the
statute. To the same effect, see AIstad v. Sim, 15 N.D. 629, 109 N.W. 66 (1906), and
Bergen Township v. Nelson County, 33 N.D. 247, 156 N.W. 559 (1915). In Barnes v. Cass
County, 59 N.D. 135, 228 N.W. 839 (1929), the court held that the fraud necessary to
upset the making of an assessment is fraud ab ntio or fraud in the apportionment of
costs and the assessment of benefits. But see Chester v. Einarson, 76 N.D. 205, 34 N.W.2d
418 (1948). In that case the court held that the statute, N.D. REv. CODE of 1943 §
61-6117 (1944) [which Is very similar to N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-18 (Supp. 1969)],
stated only that the court, on appeal, may try the questions as to whether there was suf-
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(1) whether there was sufficient cause for making the
original petition for establishing the drain;
(2) whether the drain will cost more than the benefits
to be obtained; and
(3) whether the majority of votes filed according to
the weighted system were against establishing the
drain.
If the court determines that there was not sufficient cause
for making the original petition, or that the cost of the proposed
drain will exceed the benefits, or that more than fifty percent
of the votes filed were against establishing the drain, the petition
must be denied and the proceedings discontinued .
5
11) Assessment. After the Board makes an order establish-
ing the drain it must proceed with construction, providing such
order is not disturbed on an appeal to the district court. As a prelimi-
nary, the Board must determine what percentage of the cost of
acquiring rights-of-way 86 and of constructing and maintaining the
drain will be assessed against each benefited lot, piece, parcel,
or interest in land.8 7 If certain land is already assessed in an
existing drainage district, such land cannot be assessed in the
new drainage district unless it can be shown that the land will
receive a specific benefit from the new district alone.88 In assess-
ing the percentage of cost, the Board may consider all relevant
ficient cause for making the petition for the establishment of the drain, and whether one
proposed drain would cost more than the benefits to be derived therefrom. That statutory
language, acqording to the court, did not preclude review of any action taken by the
Board leading to the order establishing the drain.
It Is the authors' opinion that by reading N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-21-15 and 61-21-18
(Supp. 1969) together, the Einarson decision has questionable validity. Although § 61-21-18
states that the court may try the questions as to whether there was sufficient cause for
the petition, whether the drain will cost more than the benefits to be derived, and whether
the majority objected to the drain, § 61-21-15 states that the petition will be denied only
if one of those questions are not determined in favor of establishing the drain. It would
therefore seem reasonable that the legislature intended that the district court's re-
view be limited to the 3 questions listed in the statute, notwithstanding the use of the
permissive term, "may." Of. Braaten v. Brenna, 63 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1954).
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-15 (Supp. 1969). See, however, N.D. CENT. CODE §
61-21-41 (1960) giving the Board authority to establish a new drain in all cases where
the drain has been enjoined, vacated, set aside, declared void, or voluntarily abandoned
by the Board.
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-19 (Supp. 1969). See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-15 (1960)
for eminent domain provisions. If a landowner will not convey land needed for a right
of way, the Board may acquire the land by eminent domain proceedings. The Board may
issue warrants to pay the cost of acquiring such land under eminent domain proceedings,
negotiate the warrants at no less than par value, and deposit the proceeds into the court
for the owner's benefit. The warrants must be paid out of a fund specifically established
for the particular drain. Any surplus of funds remaining from the proceeds of sale of
the warrants, after paying the owner the assessed damages under eminent domain pro-
ceedings, must be credited to the fund specifically established for the drain. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 61-21-19 (Supp. 1969). The award under eminent domain proceedings cannot be
offset by the benefits assessed against the land. HIeskin v. Herbrandson, 21 N.D. 232, 130
N.W. 836 (1911).
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-20 (1960).
88. Id.
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information regarding the extent of benefits each unit of land will
receive.8 9
12) Assessment Hearing The percentage assessments hav-
ing been made, the Board must hold a hearing to allow owners of
assessed land to contest the assessments. 90 It must give ten days
notice in advance of the hearing by publishing a notice in a county
newspaper of general circulation and by mailing a notice to each
affected landowner as shown by the records contained in the Regis-
ter of Deed's office.
9 1
The Board must receive all complaints regarding the percentage
assessments and either confirm or correct the percentage as re-
quired. 92 If affected landowners having a majority of the total
number of votes, based on the weighted method, are of the opinion
that the percentage assessments were made unfairly or that the
drain is improperly located or designed, they have the right to
appeal to the State Engineer for a review of the percentage assess-
ments and the location and design of the drain.
93
13) Assessment Appeal. Upon perfecting such an appeal
within ten days from the date of the hearing, the State Engineer,
after making due investigation, may correct any percentage assess-
ment that he deems inequitable or may change the location or
design of the drain if improperly located or designed by the Board.
The State Engineer may also entertain an appeal from any land-
owner who claims that his land will not benefit from the drain.
The State Engineer then is required only to determine whether
89. Id. The statute lists the following factors to consider:
a) present drainage facilities under any drainage district;
b) potential utility of the proposed drain to the land;
c) whether any lands will be benefited or harmed by any change in the existing
flow and course of drainage water by reason of the construction of the drain;
and
d) any other matter pertinent to the question of benefits.
A railroad was assessed for benefits received under a drain project in the case of North-
ern Pac. Ry. v. Richland County, 28 N.D. 172, 148 N.W. 545 (1914). The court stated that:
If they are in fact of any benefit to the railroad, and this is conceded by
the record in the case at bar (in other words, if they tend to make the
track and roadbed more secure or in extreme cases to prevent the loss of
health to passengers and employees incident to miasmal swamps), they bene-
fit the railroad as a whole and the state as a whole. We are not inclined to
hold with the appellants that the only measure of benefits is an increased
selling price.
Id. at 547.
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-21 (1960).
91. Id.
92. N.D. CENT. CODE I 61-21-22 (Supp. 1969).
93. Id. It should be emphasized that the statute in this instance requires a majority
of all of the votes which could be cast before an appeal may be taken. This should be
compared with the provisions of N.D. CENT. Cons § 61-21-14, 61-21-15 (Supp. 1969),
which state that only a majority of the votes filed is required to defeat or approve a pe-
tition for the establishment of a drain. It is possible that the legislature intended to re-
strict the review procedures after the drainage district has become relatively well estab-
lished, and to discourage frivolous appeals by only a small number of affected landown-
ers, thus avoiding needless administrative expenses.
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or not the landowner will, in fact, receive any benefit. The decision
of the State Engineer on all of these matters is final.94
14) Assessments Recorded. After the making of any
changes in the percentage assessments at the hearing or on the
appeal to the State Engineer, the Board is required to record
such assessments in the permanent records of the drain and in
the County Auditor's book of drain assessments. 95 The Board must
also prepare a finding that the benefits to all of the land involved
will exceed the total costs of the project. 96
15) Contract Letting. The Board, after recording the as-
sessments, can proceed with the letting of a contract for the con-
struction of the drain. At least ten days notice of the time and
place of the awarding of the contract is required before the award
is made. The notice must be published at least once in a newspaper
of general circulation in the county.
7
The Board must award the contract to the lowest and "best"
bidder.98 If there are equal bids, a bidding landowner assessed
for the construction of the drain is to be preferred over another
bidder who is not so assessed.99 This assumes, however, that the
bidders are equal not only in price but also in capability. 10 0
16) Monetary Assessment. With the awarding of the con-
tract, the Board finalizes what the project will cost. It can then
apply the previously determined percentage assessments to the proj-
ect cost to determine the monetary assessment. The Board must
make these arithmetical calculations and file a list of the assess-
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-22 (Supp. 1969).
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-23 (1960). Dran-assessments must include all labor and
materials expended on the drain plus all anticipated expenses, interest charges, and a
reasonable charge for establishment of a reserve fund from which tax delinquent prop-
erty may be purchased by the Board. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-62 (1960). The power of
the Board to make special assessments was upheld in Soliah v. Cormack 17 N.D. 893,
117 N.W. 125 (1908), aff'd sub norm. Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912). The power
was challenged on the ground that the levy by the Board violated §§ 13 and 25 of the
State constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that § 25 of the State constituion prohibiting delega-
tions of legislative power was not violated. The court conceded that a general tax can
only be levied by an elected official, but that a special assessment was not strictly a
tax but an adjunct of the State's police power in ordering local improvement. The court
further held that § 13 of the State constitution regarding the prohibition against taking
of property without due process of law and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution were not violated, as due process of law was provided for by the
drainage statute.
96. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-22 (Supp. 1969).
97. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-24 (Supp. 1969).
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-25 (1960). The statute also places the duty on the Board
of reserving the right to reject any and all bids. The statute further allows the Board
to postpone the awarding of contracts. -It appears that the only positive requirement con-
tained in the statute relates to the duty of the Board to award a contract only to the
lowest and "best" bidder if, indeed, a contract is awarded at all.
99. Id.
100. If the contractor falls to complete the contract within the prescribed time, includ-
ing any extensions, the Board may re-award the contract to another contractor for com-
pletion of the project and charge any excess costs to the defaulting contractor. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 61-21-26 (1960).
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ments in the County Auditor's office. 101 Thereafter, the County Treas-
urer must collect the drain taxes and credit the amounts collected
to the particular drain fund involved.
10 2
d. Financing the Drainage District.
1) Specific Fund. The Board must establish a specific ac-
count of fund for each drainage district in the county.0 3 The payment
of all proper costs incurred by the drainage district must be made
from that fund and only upon the order of the Board.
0 4
2) Warrants. To effect payment, the Board issues war-
rants 0 5 against the fund. The warrants must be signed by the
chairman and one other member of the Board. 0 6 Warrants may
be issued at any time after the order establishing the drain has
become final and after costs have been incurred.10 7 When issued
as a demand instrument to the payee (for example, the contractor
who constructed the drain) the warrant is much like a check
or draft on an ordinary bank account. The warrant must state
on its face the purpose for which it is issued and the applicable
drain fund to be charged
08
The payee of a demand warrant can receive payment by pre-
senting the warrant to the County Treasurer, who makes payment
from the fund stated on the warrant. If the Treasurer finds that
there are not sufficient monies in the fund, he must register the
unpaid warrant. Thereafter, it draws, interest at the rate of five
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-27 (1960). The total cost of establishing the drain, on
which the assessments are based, includes the cost of acquiring rights of way, the con-
tract price for the actual oonstruotion of the drain, and costs of building any bridges
or culverts as are necessary in the Board's judgment to provide ready passage between
pieces of a landowner's property that are separated by the drain. Moreover, a certain
share of the cost may be borne by the drainage district if a bridge or culvert is built on
a public highway. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-32 (1960).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-52 (1960) states that:
Drain costs and drain assessments shall include all expenditures for work
and materials for the drain, including anticipated expenses, interest charges
and a reasonable charge for the establishment of a reserve fund with which
the board may from time to time purchase tax delinquent property affected
by the drain.
In Erickson v. Cass County, 11 N.D. 494, 92 N.W. 841 (1902), the court listed the follow-
ing miscellaneous cost items which were properly included: bridges, attorneys' fees, in-
terest, incidental expenses, publishing of notices, clerks' fees, office rent, furniture, print-
ing, books, and supplies.
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-28 (1960).
103. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-06 (1960).
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-29 (1960).
105. A warrant is defined in N.D. CENT. CODE § 21-01-01(2) (1960) as follows:
The term warrant . . . shall mean an order drawn by the proper taxing
district officials on the treasurer of said taxing district, the warrant or
order to be so drawn that when signed by the treasurer in an appropriate
place it becomes a check on the taxing district depository. No warrant upon
the treasurer shall be delivered or mailed to the payee or his agent or rep-
resentative until such warrant has been signed by the treasurer and entered
on the treasurer's books as a check drawn on a bank depository.
106. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-21-19, 61-21-50 (1960).
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-50 (1960).
108 .1d.
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percent per annum until paid. 0 9 Probably few demand warrants
are paid during the early life of a drainage district, since assess-
ment collections would presumably be negligible then. For this
very reason, the Board may issue warrants with future maturities. 10
In effect, the Board can issue the equivalent of a postdated check
or a promissory note in anticipation of future assessment collections.
A warrant so issued bears interest at a rate not to exceed five
percent per annum. 11 Interest coupons, payable annually or semi-
annually, may be attached to the warrants; the date on which
the principal is payable must be stated on the face of the warrant,
along with a clear designation of the drain fund to be charged."
2
If the Board desires, it may also use the deferred payment
warrants as a means of obtaining funds. The warrants may be
sold at no less than their par value, and the proceeds thus received
are placed in the proper drain fund." 3 The interest rate of five
percent per annum might or might not be attractive; no information
is available as to the extent of drain warrant purchases by private
investors. The Board of County Commissioners is authorized to
purchase drain warrants with the proviso that the warrants be
funded by a bond issue within six months from the date of purchase.
1 4
3) Bonds. Within one hundred eighty days after filing the
drain assessments, the Board must determine the number and
amount of warrants that are unpaid and initiate proceedings to
have such unpaid warrants funded by a bond issue." 5 The Board
may also issue bonds to finance drain obligations that are not
covered by warrants, but only after a firm contract for the con-
struction of the drain has been awarded or after the work has
been completed." 6
The first step in the proceedings to initiate a bond issue is






114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-29 (1960). The purpose of the provision allowing the
Board of County Commissioners to buy drainage warrants is stated in the comment to
§ 29 of the N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 347, § 61-21-29 (1955) drafted by the North Dakota
Legislative Research Committee, as contained in the Report on Drainage Laws to the
Thirty-Fourth Legislative Assembly:
The purpose of this authority in the hands of the county commissioners is to
provide the drainage board with funds for current expenses prior to the
time tax levies begin coming in and prior to the time of the sale of their
bonds. It can be used only upon resolution of the board of county commis-
sioners and presumably would be used only when the county had surplus
funds to be invested in this type of investment for a period of up to six
months.
115. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-50 (1960).
116. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-53 (1960).
117. Id. The resolution must include:
a) The maximum amount of drain bonds proposed to be issued;
b) the maximum interest rate;
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must be published once a week for three successive weeks in
a legal newspaper of general circulation in the county."8 Moreover,
the published resolution must include a statement to the effect
that after thirty days from the date of first printing, no action
can be instituted and no defense or counterclaim will be sanctioned
by the State courts attacking the validity of warrants to be funded
by the bond issue or the validity of the assessments made in
connection with such warrants. The Board must also include in
the published notice a recitation that a complete list of the warrants
to be funded by the bond issue has been filed in the office of
the County Auditor.
120
Not less than thirty days from the date of the first publication
of the notice, and assuming that no action is instituted attacking
the validity of the warrants to be funded or the assessments made
in connection with said warrants, the Board may proceed to issue
the bonds. 12 1 If the bonds are issued to fund the warrants, the
bonds may be exchanged for the warrants with the proviso that
the "average annual net rate of interest" on the exchanged bonds,
with a maximum interest rate of six percent per annum, will
not exceed that which could have been obtained from the warrants,
with a maximum interest rate of five percent per annum. 1"
The Board may purchase the unpaid warrants with the proceeds
of the bonds. The warrants thus purchased are not cancelled but
must be retained by the Board as assets of the drainage district.
1 23
Thereafter, the Board must make regular payments on the warrants
from the applicable drain fund. Payments thus made on the war-
rants are credited to the fund from which the bonds are payable,
and are applied to service the bonds and pay interest as it becomes
due.1
24
While drainage district bonds are eligible investments for State
trust funds, 125 no information was obtained for this report regarding
the amounts, if any, of such bonds held in the portfolios of State
trust funds. To retire the bonds, the Board must establish a sinking
fund for each drainage project under which bonds have been issued.126
c) designation of the calendar years in which such bonds will mature;
d) the complete name of the drain for which such bonds are to be issued; and
e) the purpose or purposes for which the proceeds of the bonds will be used, in-
cluding the total amount of drain warrants to be bought with such proceeds.








126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-54 (1960). The fund consists of:
a) all drain assessments made for the bonds;
b) all unpaid warrants funded by the bond issue and held by the Board as assets
of the drainage district;
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4) Annual Report. In June of each year, the Board must
make a statement or report of the financial condition of each
drainage district, and file the same with the County Auditor before
July 1st.127
5) Insufficient Funds. If the Board discovers that any dis-
trict does not have funds or assessment receivables equal to all
of its obligations, 12 the Board must be reasonably assured that
the transfer of money from the general fund or from the general
property tax will be sufficient to meet the obligations of the district.
To this end, the transfer or tax can be so computed that, along
with cash on hand and expected revenues, funds will be available
to pay one hundred ten percent of the obligations. 12 9 This would
be helpful if the Board is unable to collect the full amount of
drain assessments.
At the end of the thirteen month period, the Board must return
any surplus funds to the county general fund, up to the amount
of the transfer or tax imposed. Certificates of indebtedness may
be issued by the Board to evidence the transfer of funds or tax
receipts to the drainage district. 3 0
6) Collection of Assessments. Whether warrants or bonds
or both are used to effect payment of drainage obligations, the
primary problem facing the Board is the realization of the drain
assessments with which to pay the warrants and bonds. The State
law provides that assessments may be paid by the owner of the
affected land at any time after such assessments have been filed
with the County Auditor.' 2 ' The assessments generally draw interest
from the date of filing until paid, at the same rate payable on
the warrants and/or bonds issued in anticipation of collection of
the assessments.1
3 2
The assessments constitute a special tax on the land, and confer
a lien thereon until paid.1 33 The lien imposed takes precedence
over all other liens except general tax liens, which are equal
in priority.1 4 The statute provides that any subsequent purchaser
c) all accrued interest received on sale of bonds;
d) all proceeds of bonds sold but not actually expended for the drain;
e) the reserve fund established by the original assessment, for purchase of tax
delinquent lands affected by the drain [See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-52 (1960)];
f) all general tax levies for payment of obligations of the drain; and
g) any other monies appropriated to the sinking fund.
127. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-55 (1960).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The statute apparently does not require that all of the funds received from
the county be repaid, but rather Is concerned only with any funds remaining after the
13 month period.
131. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-51 (1960).
132. Id. If the resolution of the Board authorizing Issuance of bonds is published be-
fore the assessments are filed, Interest shall accrue from the date of first publication.
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-52 (1960).
134. Id.
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of the encumbered land is given notice of the lien by the terms
of the statute.13 3
If the owner fails to pay the assessment, or any further assess-
ment if the original assessment was not sufficient to pay the costs
of the drain,138 the land can be sold to satisfy the assessment.3 7
If the Board determines that the individual assessments are
so large that payment in a lump sum would be unduly burdensome,
the assessments can be divided into more reasonable equal annual
payments extending over not more than fifteen years. 38
7) Reassessment. Any time the Board discovers that any
tract of land not originally assessed is being benefited by the
drain, proceedings must be commenced, after due notice and with
subsequent appeal rights to the owners of the affected lands, to
reassess all of the land involved. 139 The lands not originally assessed
but found to be benefited must bear their proportionate share of
the construction cost yet unpaid as well as future maintenance
expenses, according to the benefits received.
14 0
Reassessments to reflect changes in benefits received by affected
landowners may be made by the Board at any time after the
drain has been in existence for one year, and they must hear
and consider a request for reassessment upon the petition of any
affected landowner. After notice of the hearings on such reassess-
ment has been published by newspaper and by mailing copies
to affected landowners, the Board must proceed to reassess benefits
in the same manner as the original assessment was made. The
Board need not conduct reassessment proceedings more often than
once in a ten year period, and is precluded from reducing assess-
ments when there are insufficient funds available to pay the obli-
gations of the drainage district.
4 2
135. Id.
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-30 (1960). The Board, however, would have to determine
in the first Instance that the ultimate cost of the drain would not exceed the benefits.
137. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-52 (1960). If lands are sold to enforce the payment of
delinquent drain assessments, the statute requires that the provisions contained in ch.
57-24 of the Code, concerning sale of land for delinquent taxes, be followed. If the prop-
erty is sold for delinquent drain assessments alone, and no bids are received, the County
Auditor must issue a "certificate of sale for taxes" to the Board (see N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 57-24-20 (1960) for the form of the certificate.).
If the property to be sold is encumbered by delinquent general taxes as well as
drain assessments, § 61-21-52 requires that the property be advertised and sold for the
total amount of both the taxes and drain assessments. When the sale is made, the County
Aujditor issues only one certifioate of sale for taxes to the purchaser. If there are no
bids received, the County Auditor must sell the property to the county and issue the cer-
tificate of sale for taxes in the county's name. The Board may purchase any unassigned
certificates held by the 4ounty, and "[i]f no redemption is made, the affected property
shall pass absolutely to the board on expiration and termination of the time for re-
demption and may thereafter be sold by the board at public sale."
138. N.D. CENT. C3DE 9 61-21-52 (1960).
139. N.D. CENT. CODE 9 61-21-62 (Supp. 1969).
140. 1d.
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-44 (1960).
142. Id.
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8) Landowner Suits. If an affected landowner brings a
suit to enjoin the levying of an assessment or its collection, the
courts may not grant the injunction or declare the assessment
void because of: 143
(1) errors by the Board in locating and establishing
the drain;
(2) errors or informalities in the record of the proceed-
ings establishing the drain; or
(3) a defect in the conveyance of lands used for right-
of-way purposes or in the condemnation proceedings
followed to acquire such lands.
Upon application of either party to the action, the court must
appoint a person or persons to examine the lands or make a
survey, or both. At a final hearing, after submission of the exam-
iner's or surveyor's report, the court, using its equitable powers,
can make an order confirming the assessment or denying any




e. Maintenance of the Drain
The Board, after having established the drain, has continuing
responsibilities that are extremely important to the successful man-
agement of the drainage district. The most important of these
post-construction responsibilities is the duty to keep the drain open
and in repair.145 If fifty-one percent of the votes of all affected
landowners, as determined by the weighted method, are registered
143. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-40 (1960). The right of an affected landowner to bring
suit would seem to be limited by the provisions of N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-22 (Supp.
1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-53 (1960).
In Alstad v. Sim, 15 N.D. 629, 109 N.W. 66, 69 (1906), the court stated that:
A court of equity will not extend its extraordinary remedy of injunotion
to prevent the collection of assessments for benefits Imposed to pay the cost
of constructing drains, when the parties seeking such relief have been ac-
tively or impliedly consenting parties to its cpnstruction and to the pro-
ceedings which led to the assessments, whether such assessments are le-
gally valid or not [the court quoting from Erickson v. Cass County, 11 N.D.
494, 92 N.W. 841 (1902)].
The Court thus held that laches prevented the plaintiffs from succeeding since they had
done nothing until the work had been accomplished on the drain. There were numerous
irregularities in the proceedings establishing the drain and, had the plaintiff brought a
more timely action, the court might have granted the injunction against collection of
the assessment since the cumulative effect of the irregularities appeared quite
serious.
It is interesting to note that N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-26-07 (1968), dealing with spe-
cial assessments made by municipalities for improvements, provides for a 6-month per-
iod after the assessment has been approved, during which time any actions must be
brought against the assessment or be barred. The drainage law has no similar statute of
limitation, but, as is indicated in Astad v. Sim, supra, the courts effectively use the
equitable doctrine of laches to accomplish the same result.
144. N.D. CEN'% CODE § 61-21-40 (1960).
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-42 (1960).
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on a petition to clean or repair the drain, the Board must comply
with the petition to the extent that funds are available.' 4"
The Board must also notify landowners and their tenants to
remove obstructions to the drain caused by the negligence of the
landowner or his tenant. 147 The notice must inform the alleged
negligent party of (1) the exact nature of the obstruction, (2)
the Board's opinion as to causation, (3) a date not sooner than
thirty days from the date of the notice, by which time the obstruction
must be removed and after which the Board will take unilateral
action to remove the obstruction and assess the cost against the
land involved, and (4) the right to demand a hearing on the matter
within fifteen days from the date the notice was mailed.14' If the
landowner demands a hearing, the Board must set a hearing
date within, fifteen days from the date the demand is received.
If the landowner wishes, he may appeal the Board's action to
the district court or he may appeal directly to the district court
without demanding a hearing before the Board. 49
On normal maintenance functions, if the total value of the
repairs does not exceed two thousand dollars per annum, the Board
can have the work performed on a day work basis or can award
a contract without advertising; otherwise, it must follow the con-
tracting procedures required for drain construction. 50
f. Financing Maintenance of the Drain
To finance maintenance, the Board must assess the affected
lands for the cost involved in the same proportion that the original
or any subsequent reassessments were levied for construction of
the drain.' 51
The maximum maintenance levy for any year is fifty cents
per acre for agricultural land.152 If funds are needed for maintenance,
the land receiving the most benefits when the drain was established
can be assessed the full fifty cents per acre; all other agricultural
lands in the district are assessed in the proportion that their original
assessments bear to the original assessment of the land bearing
146. Id.
147. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-43.1 (Supp. 1969). If an emergency exists, the Board
may immediately apply for an injunction prohibiting the landowner from maintaining
the obstruction.
148. Id.
149. Id. The appeal is governed by N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-16-36 through 61-16-39 (1960)
dealing with conservation and flood control districts.
150. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-45 (Supp. 1969).
151. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-43 (1960). If no original assessment was made, the Board
must proceed to establish the assessments, using the same procedure as when determining
assessments for the establishment of a drain.
If the drainage fund has funds left over from the construction of the drain over
and above the amount required to retire all outstanding obligations incurred In the con-
struction phase, such funds may be used for maintenance and no special levy is required.
1947 Op. N.D. ATT'Y GEN. 86.
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-46 (Supp. 1969).
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the full fifty cents per acre. 158 Nonagricultural property is assessed
a yearly sum in a ratio that the original assessment of such
land bears to the assessment made on agricultural land drawing
the maximum maintenance levy.'5
If the maintenance work is of such magnitude that the maximum
levy of fifty cents per acre will not be sufficient to pay the costs
thereof, the Board may accumulate a fund not to exceed the amount
that would be obtained by levying the maximum amount for a two
year period.1 55 If the costs of maintenance will exceed the maximum
levy for a two year period, the Board must obtain approval by
majority vote, under the weighted method, of the landowners before
any work can be undertaken.156
g. Lateral Drains
In addition to the post-construction duty of maintaining the
drain, the Board has another function that is important to the
development of the drainage district-the establishment of lateral
drains. 57
One or more landowners may petition the Board for construction
of a lateral drain, at which time they must also submit a bond
for the payment of all construction costs.1SIf improvements in
153. Id. Reading N.D. CENT. CODE §9 61-21-43 (1960) and 61-21-46 (Supp. 1969) to-
gether, the assessment computation can be stated in the following example taken from
1947 Op. N.D. AT'r'Y GEN. 85, 86 Interpreting similar provisions:
Assuming that the amount apportioned against a tract of land described
as the northwest quarter of section 1, township -, within the drainage
district, originally was $320.00, or $2.00 per acre, and assuming that this
amount was the maximum sum apportioned to any quarter within the dis-
trict; when such drain Is cleaned or repaired, said quarter would be assessed
at fifty cents per acre or $80.00, if the maximum amount of fifty cents is
required. In other words, the maximum assessment permitted under Chapter
329 against section 1 for cleaning and repairing such drain would be 25
percent of the original cost
Now, regardless of what the amounts apportioned to other lands may be,
applying 25 percent to the benefits originally apportioned to such lands will
give the amount which should be apportioned thereto for cleaning and re-
pairing the drain, provided the maximum amount of fifty cents per acre Is
levied. Thus, if $275.00 was originally apportioned to the said northeast
quarter of section 1, the amount apportioned under the fifty cents per acre
levy would be 25 percent of $275.00, or $68.75; or if the amount originally
apportioned to the southwest quarter of section 1 was $200.00, the amount
apportioned under the fifty cents per acre levy would be $50.00. If the maxi-
mum levy assessed by the county board is, for example, 25 cents per acre,
then the amount apportioned to the said northwest quarter of section 1 in
the Illustration used would be $40.00, or 12.5 percent By applying 12.5 per-
cent to each assessment originally apportioned, the total assessment appor-
tioned to each quarter section would be readily ascertained.
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-46 (Supp. 1969). The example on agricultural lands in
note 153, supra, would apply to illustrate the determination of assessments on nonagricul-
tural lands.
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-46 (Supp. 1969).
156. Id.
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-39 (Supp. 1969). A lateral drain is defined as . . . a
drain constructed after the establishment of the original drain or drainage system and
which flows into such original drain or drainage systems from outside the limits of the
original drain.... ." N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-01 (4) (Supp. 1969). The Board's deter-
mination as to whether the drain is a lateral or new drain is conclusive.
158. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-39 (Supp. 1969). The statute requires that the same pro-
'cedures be used as when establishing an original drain. This apparently means that if
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the original drain are necessary for the establishment of the lateral
drain, the cost of such improvements must be assessed to the
petitioners and collected in the same manner as other drain assess-
ments, unless the improvements made in whole or in part to the
original drain are also beneficial to the other landowners. In this
case, the cost of the improvement which is beneficial to others
may be assessed to such benefited landowners. 59 The petitioners
must also pay a fair share of the cost of establishing the original
drain according to the benefits received as a result of connecting
the lateral drain to the original drain.,6 0
After the petitioners have paid their assessment, the lateral
drain may be constructed by the petitioners at their own expense.' 6'
The Board must assure itself that anyone constructing a lateral
drain that connects with the original drain complies with the pro-
cedures specified. If a lateral drain has been constructed without
complying with the statute, the Board is authorized to fill in or
otherwise block the lateral drain and charge the costs to the land-
owner, or bring an action in the district court to enjoin the estab-
lishment or maintenance of the lateral drain.
162
h. Dissolution of the Drainage District and Merger With a
Water Management District
As a drainage district is established, so may it be dissolved.
If landowners with fifty-one percent of the possible votes, according
to the weighted method, petition the Board for dissolution of the
district, the Board must conduct a public hearing to determine if,
in fact, the required percentage of votes favors dissolution. 163 If
the Board so finds and the district has no outstanding obligations,
the district must be dissolved, and a record of the Board's finding
to this effect must be made and published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the county.164 All collected assessments not
spent must be returned to the affected landowners in the same
the majority of landowners vote against the establishment of the lateral drain, the petition
must be denied. Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-39 (2) (Supp. 1969).
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-39 (Supp. 1969).
160. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-39 (1) (Supp. 1969). The money so received, must be
credited to the proper drain fund. There would presumably be many instances where the
original drain had already been paid for at the time the petition was made for a lateral
drain. Notwithstanding this, it seems fair that the petitioners should still pay a share of
the construction costs since they are benefiting from the original drain. The money so
received could well be used for maintenance of the original drain.
161. Id. If the petitioner(s) fail to construct the lateral drain, the board must com-
mence proceedings to have the drain constructed. In such an event, the petitioners would
presumably forfeit their bond.
162. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-39(3) (1960). A penalty of $100.00 or 30 days in the
county jail, or both, may be imposed on anyone violating the statute. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-21-39(4) (1960).
163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-56 (Supp. 1969).
164. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-66 (Supp. 1969) requiring that sufficient funds
must be maintained and assessments continued if there are any outstanding obligations.
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proportions as they were assessed for establishment of the drain.6 5
Once dissolved, the district cannot be revived unless it is reestablish-
ed in the same manner that a new drainage district is created. 6
The existence of a drainage district can also be terminated,
subject to settlement of its outstanding obligations, 1 67 by consolidating
with a water management district. 16s The consolidation can be effect-
ed by one of three methods: 1 9
1) a resolution by the Board of County Commissioners;
2) a resolution by the Board of Drain Commissioners; or
3) a petition filed with the Board of County Commissioners
containing the signatures of landowners in the district
holding at least fifteen percent of the votes as detr-
mined by the weighted method.
If the petition or resolution for consolidation is made, the Board
of County Commissioners must set a date for a public hearing
on the resolution or petition, publish the notice by newspaper,
and mail copies of the notice to all affected landowners within
the drainage district.17 0
At the hearing, if a majority of the weighted votes are cast
against the continuance of the proceedings, the proceedings must
be discontinued; but if the majority of weighted votes cast approve
the consolidation, the Board of County Commissioners must file a
petition'7 ' with the State Water Commission for the drainage district
to be included in a water management district. 7 2 If that petition
is approved, the Board of County Commissioners must adopt a
resolution dissolving the drainage district and transferring the prop-
erty of the drainage district to the water management district.1" 3
In order that drainage districts may be efficiently merged with
water management districts, the legislature recently enacted a stat-
ute giving the Board of Commissioners of a water management
district all of the powers enjoyed by the Board of Drain Commis-
sioners.
174
165. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-56 (Supp. 1969).
166. Id.
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-66 (Supp. 1969).
168. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-65 (Supp. 1969). A water management district can be
created under the provisions of N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 61-16 (1960). These districts are
not discussed in this article, but will be discussed in a subsequent article.
169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-65 (Supp. 1969).
170. Id.
171. The petition is governed by N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-16-02 (1960.).
172. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-65 (Supp. 1969).
173. Id.
174. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 473, § 1 (1967) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-16-11(11) (Supp. 1969).
In a telephone interview with Mr. Milo W. Hoisveen, Chief Engineer for the North Da-
kota State Water Commission, on June 7, 1968, Mr. Hoisveen indicated to Mr. Bohlman
that there was indeed a duplication of functions now existing between water manage-
ment and drainage districts, but that apparently there were no immediate plans to abol-
ish drainage districts in favor of water management districts.
A water management district, of course, is much wider In its scope of operations
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The system of water management districts may well be a
more efficient means of handling drainage problems than the various
county drainage districts. For here the State Water Commission,
a central organ, can presumably coordinate and influence the oper-
ations of the various districts to provide an integrated drainage
network for the state. The various county drainage districts have
no central organ to coordinate and influence their activities. 75 More
important, however, is the fact that the water management districts
provide for total water resource planning, of which drainage is
only a part. The water management districts are concerned with
all aspects of water control and development. They would consider
a drainage project, for example, in light of all the possible conse-
quences that may result, such as possible flooding in other areas.
The county drain boards have no similar responsibility for total
water resource planning to guide their actions.
On the other hand, the State Water Commission appears to
provide substantial financial support to drainage districts, whether
or not they are merged into a water management district:
The Commission drainage program is devoted primarily to
the construction of floodways that serve large areas subject
to water damage. This program was initiated in 1943 when
the Legislature appropriated funds to the Commission to
assist in its implementation ...
Funds appropriated to the Commission for drainage work
are allocated to the various drainage projects that qualify
for State assistance in accordance with their rules and regu-
lations. State assistance to counties for this work is generally
40% of the qualified construction costs. The Commission will
only cooperate in the construction of legal drains which are
constructed under the sponsorship of some legal entity, such
as the board of drain commissioners. . . . The local share
of the drain costs are paid by special assessments levied
on the property benefitted by the improvementY.
7 6
than a drainage district. A water management district encompasses such functions, in
addition to drainage, as water conservation, flood control, and watershed improvement.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-16-01(4) (SupP. 1969).
175. This is not to say that county drainage districts are restricted to only 1-county
projects. The code allows the drain boards of 2 or more counties to jointly establish
drains. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-33 (1960). When such an action is taken the procedure
for establishing and maintaining the drain is the same as when establishing a drain in
only 1 county, N.D. CENT. CODs § 61-21-34 (1960).
In the case of Northern Pac. Ry. v. Sargent County, 43 N.D. 156, 164, 174 N.W.
811, 818-814 (1919), the court commented that:
The law which permits drain commissioners of two or more counties to CO-
operate in the construction of an inter-county drain does not destroy the
unity of action by the drain commissioners of one county when proceeding
with relation to that portion of the project situated in such county. The co-
operation is Joint, but the action of each of the counties concerned is the
individual action of such county.
176. [1964-1966] N.D. STATE WATER COMM'N BIENNIAL RP. 13, 14.
The Report lists the following drainage projects of the State Water Commission:
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But the probabilities weigh in favor of the county drain boards
being phased out in favor of water management districts over
the coming years. This has happened to some extent already:
There are at present, forty-three water management districts
in thirty-seven separate counties. Of this number, five have
taken over the duties of the drainage boards. In Richland
County the water management district has formally taken
Drainage
SwC Area
No. Project County (Sq. Mi.) Scope of Work
416 Devils Lake Basin
463 Rush Lake
1062 Zahn-International Drain
1074 Cass County Drain No. 19
1075 Cass County Drain No. 21
1076 Cass County Drain No. 22
1084 Cass County Drain No. 32
1111 Grand Forks Drain No. 12
1119 Grand Forks Drain No. 30
1133 Pembina County Drainage-
General
1135 Pembina County Drain No. 4-18
1141 Pembina County Drain No. 13
Pembina County Drain No. 18
Pembina County Drain No. 34
Richland County Drain No.
Richland County Drain No.
Richland County Drain No.
Richland County Drain No.
Traill County Drain No. 8






Ramsey 4,170.0 Engineering and investigation,
Benson and Sweetwater-Dry Lake Flood
Towner Control and Lake Restoration
Project No. 1
Cavalier 315.0 Engineering, investigation
Bottineau 44.0 Investigations
Case 9.25 Investigation, engineering, hy-
draulic improvement (recon-
struction)
Cass 36.0 Investigation, engineering-
extension 5.73 miles
Cass 12.0 Investigation, engineering
Cass 10.5 Investigation, engineering,
and reconstruction
Grand Forks 93.0 Reconstruction
Grand Forks 6.0 Reconstruction
Pembina 54.7 Investigations (Auger Coulee-
Rhineland International Drain-
age Problems)
Pembina 31.0 Investigation, reconstruction
Pemblna 37.0 Investigation, engineering (re-












Cass County Drain No. 23 Cass 18.0
Grand Forks County Drain No. 3 Grand Forks 5.0
Traill County Drain No. 39 Traill 4.0
Barnes County Drain No. 2 Barnes 15.0
Auger Coulee Improvement Pembina 47.0
St. Thomas-Lodema Watershed Pembina 106.0
Bathgate-Hamilton Watershed I Pembina 57.0
International Boundary Drain Pembina 13.3
Traill County Drain No. 40 TraIl 3.0
Richland County Drain No. 66 Richland 11.3
Traill County Drain No. 44 Traill 8.0
Walsh County Drain No. 8 Walsh 11.0
Trail County Drain N6. 9 Traill [not listed]
Mulberry Creek Drain Cavalier [not listed]
Cypress Creek Drain Cavalier [not listed]

















Id. at 21, 22. An Inventory of Legal Drains in North Dakota appearing in Appendix C to
NOTRH DAKOTA STATE WATER COMMISSION, NORTH DAKOTA INTERIM STATE WATER RE-
SOURCES DEVELOPuENNT PLAN (1968), contains a listing of 233 legal drains. Three of these
are in the James River Subbasin, nine in the Souris River Subbasin, fifty-one in the Wild
Rice River Subbasin, sixteen in the Sheyenne River Subbasin, thirteen in the Elm River
Subbasin, twelve in the Goose River Subbasin, four in the Turtle River Subbasin, eight in
the Forest River Subbasin, seventeen in the Park River Subbasin, twenty three in the
Pembina River Subbasin, and seventy seven in the Red River Mainstem. It Is not clear,
of course, under the auspices of which local authority they were constructed.
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control of all drains and drainage work within the county.
In Walsh County the drain board resigned and the water
management district has filled the gap. In Pembina County
the county commissioners have appointed the same people
to the two boards. This board operated as the Pembina
County Water Management District and Drainage Board.
In Bottineau and Wells County there were older drainage
boards which apparently became defunct, as no drainage
work had been done for a number of years. In these two
counties the water management districts have taken on the
responsibilities of the drainage board and are currently car-
ing for the maintenance of the drains.
17
7
i. Drainage Projects under the Federal Watershed Protection
and Flood Prevention Act
Under the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act,"
1 8
drainage facilities can also be established as a part of a multiple-
purpose watershed project. 1 9 In North Dakota, the water manage-
ment districts can sponsor an application that has first been ap-
proved at the State level by the State soil conservation committee.1 80
It would seem highly unlikely that the Federal act would be
utilized as a means of establishing individual drainage projects,
since the act applies to watershed development as a whole. It
is important to keep in mind, however, that a plan could be devel-
oped whereby drainage facilities could be included under that portion
of the plan entitled "agricultural water management." 181 The drain-
age function under agricultural water management is described
as follows:
The drainage measures must provide for more efficient land
use on existing farms and ranches. Present drainage systems
may be improved. Or new drainage systems may be provided
for areas now used for crops or grazing. The measures in-
clude all parts of a group drainage system, such as open
ditch or tile, drops, checks, flumes, control gates, manholes,
and pumping plants.18
2
The advantage of applying for a multiple-purpose watershed
project is that the drainage system for an entire watershed could
be established, or existing drains improved, if the plan was approved.
Needless to say, the plan would have to be drawn very carefully
in order to provide a comprehensive system of drains for the
177. Letter from Alan Grindberg, Ass't. Chief Engineer, N.D. State Water Commission,
to Bruce Bohlman, June 11, 1968.
178. 68 Stat. 666 (1954), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1009 (1964).
179. See U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE, MULTIPLE-PURPOSE WATERSHED PROJECTS UUDER
PUBLIC LAW 566 (1963).
180. 1d. at 18.
181. Id. at 5.
182. rd.
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entire watershed. Arguably, such a system of coordinated drains
is superior to a system based on what each individual county
drain board can accompilsh, acting alone, and concerned only with
providing drains in the local county area. The extent to which
the act has been utilized to establish comprehensive drainage sys-
tems has not been ascertained, but the mere fact that Federal
aid is available is but another indication that our water and soil
resources are of national concern and no longer the exclusive domain
of such local agencies as the county Board of Drain Commissioners.
2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
It is helpful in understanding statute law to know something
of its history as this explains at least in part how the law came
into being. But history is also helpful by showing approaches that
have been tried before and found not to work. Further, the simple
indication that change has taken place warrants an awareness that
some of the court decisions that a researcher finds may deal
with outdated statutory provisions. With these several purposes in
mind, a special subpart on history is used rather than integration
of the material into other parts of the article.
North Dakota's comprehensive drainage district law has existed
since 1883,183 thus predating statehood. Moreover, there have been
only ten legislative sessions up to the present time where no drainage
laws have been enacted.1 8 4 This extensive legislative activity has
necessitated periodic revisions of the laws into workable compila-
tions for use by the county commissioners and later the county
drain board commissioners, the governmental bodies charged with
the responsibility of administering the law. A perusal of the major
revisions indicates a basic conclusion, one perhaps common to all
public functions and the agencies responsible for carrying out these
functions: although the drainage laws have been changed often
over the years and a great deal of administrative complexity has
been introduced, the basic methods of establishing a drain project
remain much the same today as those first set up in 1883. The
legislature has only detailed what the early administrators implied
from the first laws. In the 1880's, administrative expediency pre-
vailed over legislative action as a means of clarifying ambiguous
provisions. As time passed, however, the legislature was increasingly
called upon to specifically define and set forth the exact nature
of the powers and duties of those responsible for drainage projects.
The result is somewhat analogous to the Internal Revenue Code
of the Federal Government, with its myriad of exceptions and
183. LAWs OF DAKOTA, ch. 75 (1883).
184. A search by Mr. Bohlman of the territorial and session laws indicates that drain-
'502
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cross-referrals. Hopefully, the present drainage law is comprehens-
ible to the various boards of drain commissioners. If not, it is
possible that principle of expedience might again prevail and that
the law will be administered as it was in the beginning.
Under this first comprehensive drainage act, enacted in 1883,155
the Board of County Commissioners and the township supervisors
were designated as the bodies responsible for construction of a
drain upon the petition of one or more landowners. 88 A bond was
also required of the petitioner(s) for the payment of expenses
should the drain petition be denied.
187
Upon the filing of a petition, the Board of County Commissioners
appointed three disinterested resident landowners of the county as
"viewers." The viewers, along with a surveyor, made a survey
of the proposed drain site, estimated the cost of the drain, deter-
mined the amount that each affected tract of land would be bene-
fited, made a set of specifications, and ascertained the names
of landowners affected by the drain.'88
After the viewers filed their report, an interested person could
file a remonstrance against establishment of the drain, and the
Board of County Commissioners would then appoint three additional
disinterested resident landowners as "reviewers."' 8 9 The reviewers
would either confirm or deny the findings of the viewers and the
Board of County Commissioners would then enter an order estab-
lishing or denying the drain, based on the reviewers' report.190
After the Board of County Commissioners ordered the establish-
ment of a drain, the viewers, or reviewers, also determined the
amount to be assessed each benefited landowner and the damages
to be paid those landowners whose land had to be used for right-
of-way purposes.' 9' Any person affected by the action taken could
appeal to the district court on the questions of whether the drain
was conducive to the public health, convenience, or welfare; whether
the route chosen was the most practicable; whether the assessments
set were made in accordance with benefits to be received; or
whether the damages under condemnation proceedings were fair.
9 2
After the construction of the drain, the landowners possessing
land through which the drain ran were responsible for keeping
it open and free of obstructions.' 93 The township supervisors were
age laws were enacted in all sessions of the legislature with the exceptions of 1889, 1891,
1897, 1909, 1918, 1923, 1929, 1931, 1939, and 1941.
185. LAws or DAKOTA, ch. 75 (1883).
186. Id. § 2.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. § 11.
190. Id. § 15.
191. Id. § 16.
192. Id. § 17.
193. Id. § 22.
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responsible for raising revenues to pay for maintenance and repair.
19'
If ten or more landowners in any town petitioned for a drain,
the project could be financed by a bond issue upon approval by
a majority of legal voters casting votes at the meeting called
for that purpose.9 5 This method of financing the drain was appar-
ently open only to a township board of supervisors, the Board
of County Commissioners having no similar authority.
The 1883 act did not, however, provide for a vote of all affected
landowners to approve or disapprove establishment of the drain.
Further, there was no provision for dissolution of the drain once
it was established.
The second comprehensive drainage act was enacted in 1893.16
The ad hoc system of "viewers" and "reviewers" was abolished
in favor of the establishment of the present-day Board of Drain
Commissioners. The petition for construction of a drain now was
to be submitted to the drain board and had to be signed by at
least five landowners, instead of only one, as required under the
1883 act.197
In Martin v. Tyler,19 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that one section of the 1883 drainage law was unconstitutional as
violative of the North Dakota constitutional requirement of paying
cash for land acquired under eminent domain proceedings. 199 The
act allowed payment in the form of warrants, which are the equiva-
lent of a claim or check against a fund. However, such warrants
do not constitute money per se; rather, they constitute security
for the later payment of money. Another section of the act was
held unconstitutional on the ground that by issuing twenty year
bonds to finance the construction of the drainage project, the county
was lending its credit for an unauthorized purpose in violation
of section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution.
2 0 0
The entire act then was held a nullity since the unconstitutional
provisions could not be stricken without rendering the whole act
194. Id. § 23. No mention is made of the duties, if any, of the Board of County Com-
missioners.
195. LAws or DAKOTA, ch. 76 (1883).
196. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 55 (1893).
197. Id. § 5.
198. Martin v. Tyler, 4 N.D. 278, 60 N.W. 392 (1894), rehearing denied Oct. 13, 1894.
199. Id. at 399. The North Dakota Constitution, as then existing, provided as follows:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without Just
compensation having been first made to, or paid into court for the owner,
and no right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation,
other than municipal, until full compensation therefor be first made in
money or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any
benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which com-
pensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived.
N.D. CONST., § 14, art. I (1889).
200. N.D. CoxsT. § 185, art. XII (1889).
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useless, especially in view of the fact that the eminent domain
provisions could no longer be enforced.
201
In response to Martin v. Tyler, the legislature enacted another
comprehensive drainage law in 1895.202 One section of the 1895
act provided that after assessment of the amount of damages to
be paid for the acquisition of land under eminent domain proce-
dures, the county drain commissioners would negotiate warrants
to pay the same and deposit the money realized into court for
the benefit of the affected landowner. The section was challenged
in Redmon v. Chacey,203 again on the basis of the constitutional
section prohibiting the counties from loaning their credit. The North
Dakota Supreme Court, however, upheld the act since the warrants
were not issued by the county but rather by the autonomous Board
of Drain Commissioners. Hence the county was not involved and
was in no way obligated under the warrants. Moreover, even though
the county could still issue bonds, 20 4 the court held that the county
was not lending its credit since the statute specifically stated that
the county was not obligated on the bonds, and the bondholder
could look only to the drainage fund for payment.
2 0 5
The 1895 act failed, as did the 1883 act, to provide for an
initial vote by affected landowners before the drain could be estab-
lished. However, it did specify that the petition to establish the
drain had to be signed by a:
[S]ufficient number of the citizens of such municipality...
to satisfy the drain commissioners that there is a public de-
mand for such drain. If the chief purposes of such drain is
the drainage of agricultural, meadow, grazing or other lands,
the drain commissioners shall require that the petition be
signed by the owners . . . as in the aggregate will, in the
event of the construction of the drain, be liable to assessment
for a major portion of the cost thereof .... 206
The county commissioners, rather than the township supervisors,
now were charged with the duty of maintaining the drain after
it was established, and the costs of such maintenance were assess-
able against the affected landowners in the same proportion as
they were assessed for construction of the drain.20 7
So the 1895 act, other than failing to provide for specific voting,
201. Martin v. Tyler, 4 N.D. 278, 60 N.W. 392, 899 (1894).
202. N.D. Sess Laws ch. 51 (1895).
203. Redmon v. Chacey, 7 N.D. 231, 73 N.W. 1081 (1898).
204. See N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 51, § 31 (1898).
205. Redmon v. Chacey, 7 N.D. 231, 73 N.W. 1081, 1082 (1898).
206. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 51, § 4 (1895). It might be argued that the section required
a majority of landowners, or at least that number of landowners subject to at least 50%
of the assessments, to sign the petition.
207. Id. § 24.
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lateral drains, and dissolution provisions, is very similar to the
current drainage law chapter of the North Dakota Century Code.
Until 1911 the drainage law was amended only slightly. In
1911, the legislature gave the drain board the authority to levy
an additional assessment if the original assessment was insufficient
to pay the costs of establishing the drain.20 8 Also in that year,
provisions for establishing a lateral drain were enacted.
2 0 9
In 1915, the legislature passed a statute allowing townships
to establish drains as separate projects under the township super-
visors.210 The statute was in force until 1963, when the legislature
repealed it2 1 1 because no drain projects had been carried out pur-
suant to its terms.
212
Another system of drainage agencies, namely reclamation dis-
tricts, was created by the legislature in 1953.213 Reclamation districts
were to drain surface waters where it was not considered feasible
to do so by the county Board of Drain Commissioners. This ad-
ditional agency within the county, established to carry out drainage
functions whenever it was not "feasible" for one drain board to
do so, could undoubtedly have caused numerous conflicts as to
jurisdiction over drains, and the legislature repealed the authorizing
legislation in 1963.214
Many drainage statutes were enacted from 1917 to 1953 and
a major revision of the numerous statutes became necessary. In
1955, the North Dakota Legislative Research Committee authorized
a study of the law and noted the following:
The resolution directing a study of drainage laws was a
result of the numerous bills that are introduced at every
session to amend the laws of the State . . . relating to drain-
age districts and their operation. The number of bills that
have been introduced on this subject at every session is in-
dicative of the fact that the laws governing the operation
of drainage districts have grown obsolete, making it very
difficult for the drainage districts to function properly and
carry out the responsibilities placed upon them by statute.
In addition, the large number of amendments made to the
chapter on drainage over the years has resulted in many
conflicts of law and ambiguities, and in many instances has
made the drainage law almost unintelligible.
2 15
The result of the study was the enactment of a major revision
208. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 124 (1911).
209. Id. ch. 125.
210. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 124 (1915) [see N.D. CENT. COmE ch. 61-22 (1960)].
211. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 421, § 22 (1963).
212. 1963 REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATURE RESEARCH COMMITTEE 54.
213. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 348 (1953) [see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 61-25 (1960)].
214. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 421, § 22 (1963).
215. 1955 REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CoMrITEE 22.
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in 1955 which constitutes the basic act in use today. There have
been amendments since 1955, and perhaps a further overhaul of
the law will be necessary within a few years. But this may well
depend on the continued use of the Board of Drain Commissioners
as the organization responsible for drainage projects. But 'even
if the water management districts assume all of the responsibilities
of the drain boards, 216 there still must be statutory guidelines for
the establishment of drain projects, and these are contained in
the drainage laws rather than the water management laws.
B. CITY JOINT USE OF DRAINS
The North Dakota legislature has provided that drainage projects
may serve a multi-purpose function, and has established a proce-
dure whereby the governing body of any city or the commissioners
of a water management district may apply to the Board of Drain
Commissioners to use a drain as a source of water supply.
The application must contain a plan that presents the specific
details of the proposed joint use, including the following : 21
(1) any proposed extension of the drain;
(2) changes required in the drain;
(3) connecting canals;
(4) mains or other means by which the water will be
conducted in, to, or from the drain; and
(5) an offer of a specific sum of money as payment for
the proportionate share of the cost of the existing
drain,218 and an amount or percentage for future main-
tenance.
After receiving the application, the Board must arrange for
a public hearing, following the same procedures required for a
hearing on a petition for establishing a drain.219 At the time and
place of the hearing, the Board must receive all opinions and
evidence favoring or disfavoring the proposed joint use of the drain
and the necessary modifications incident thereto.
220
Following the hearing, assuming that the application is not
denied, the Board may enter into a joint use agreement with the
216. See notes 167-177, eupra, and the accompanying text.
217. N.D. CNT. CODE § 61-26-01 (Supp. 1969).
218. Presumably the proportionate share would amount to the benefits received under
joint use of the drain.
219. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-26-02 (Supp. 1969). See N.D. CiNT. CODE § 61-21-19 (Supp.
1969) for procedures on calling a hearing on the petition for establishment of a drain.
220. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-26-02 (Supp. 1969). The statute is not clear as to whether
a vote of affected landowners approving or disapproving the application is required.
However, since the procedures governing the notice of hearing on the petition for estab-
lishment of a drain [see N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-13 (Supp. 1969)] provide for voting, it
is likely that the application could be denied by a vote of affected landowners, based on
the weighted method [see N.D. CExT. CODE § 61-21-16 (Supp. 1969)].
507
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city or water management district.221 The agreement must specifi-
cally cover the extent and nature of the use of the drain, any
conditions attached thereto, the amount to be paid by the city
or water management district as its share of the original cost
of the drain, and the percentage or amount to be contributed
for future maintenance costs.
222
The money received by the Board under the agreement must
be credited to the specific drain fund involved. 223 If the Board
determines that the amount received for the city's or water man-
agement district's share of the cost of establishing the original
drain will not be needed for future maintenance, it may choose
to distribute such funds to the record owners of lands originally
assessed for the drain in the same proportion that such lands
were assessed. 2 4 The Board may prescribe an application form
for use by affected landowners in requesting reimbursement; after
processing the applications, the Board may make payment by is-
suing warrants against the drain fund involved.
225
C. NORTH DAKOTA INSTITUTIONAL DRAINAGE CASES
The early decisions of the North Dakota courts dealt mainly
with the constitutionality of the drainage law. Martin v. Tyler226
and Redmon v. Chacey227 have already been discussed. 2 8 With the
exception of Martin, no other decision has sustained constitutional
attacks against the drainage law. In Erickson v. Cass County,2 2 9
the court upheld the bonding provisions against a fourteenth amend-
ment due process attack, whereby assessments under the statute
were to be deferred over the life of the bonds. The appellant
in May v. Cass County,230 a companion case to the Erickson decision,
unsuccessfully contended that county commissioners cannot consti-
tutionally be authorized to issue bonds against a drainage district.
The court dismissed the argument after finding no such constitutional
restriction.
In Soliah v. Board of Drain Commissioners,23 1 the court rejected
221. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-26-02 (Supp. 1969).
222. Id.
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-26-03 (1960).
224. Id. The record owners referred to in the statute are those who own at the time
the city or water management district makes the payment.
If the original drain was not yet paid for, however, it goes without saying that the
Board would not make a distribution as provided by the statute until such time as the
costs of establishing the drain had been paid, and then only to the extent that any funds
were left over.
225. Id.
226. 4 N.D. 278, 60 N.W. 392 (1894), rehearing denied Oct 13, 1894.
227. 7 N.D. 231, 73 N.W. 1081 (1898).
228. See text relating to notes 198-205, supra.
229. 11 N.D. 494, 92 N.W. 841 (1902).
230. 12 N.D. 137, 96 N.W. 292 (1903).
231. May v. Cass County, 17 N.D. 393, 117 N.W. 125 (1908), aff'd sub non. Sollab v.
Heskin. 222 U.S. 522 (1912).
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the argument that the drainage law was an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power to the Board of Drain Commissioners.
Moreover, the court also refused to find that the drainage law
was defective under due process requirements of the State and
United States Constitutions. Four years later, in 1912, the court
similarly rejected another due process attack in the case of Hackney
v. Elliott.23 2 Since that time, there has not been another serious
challenge as to the constitutionality of the drainage law.
Other cases interpreting the drainage law have dealt with a
variety of subjects. Under the condemnation provisions of the law,
two cases are notable. In Ross v. Prante,'23 3 the court held that
although the jury assesses the damages under such proceedings, the
Board of Drain Commissioners, and not the jury, has the authority
to determine the amount of benefits to be assessed against other
property of the landowner whose land is also being condemned
for a drain right of way. This is so, even though that portion
of the drainage law authorizing condemnation of lands provided
that all of the issues involved in the action must be submitted
to the jury. According to the court, the question of benefits was
not an issue in determining damages under condemnation proceed-
ings. For instance, in Heskin v. Herbrandson,2 34 the court held
that the amount of benefits to be received from a drain must
not be deducted from the damage award. To some extent, the
court relied on their decision in Ross. The court empha-
sized again that the determination of damages and the assessment
of benefits were separate issues and must be treated as such.
The largest body of case law has undoubtedly dealt with the
jurisdiction of the Board of Drain Commissioners to assess benefits
and establish the drain, and the right of appeal by affected land-
owners subsequent to assessment and establishment. Most of the
cases do not indicate a lack of the right to appeal the Board's
decisions (since such a right is provided by statute), but only
that the plaintiffs' claims for relief were barred by laches (undue
affected landowner who objects to the order of the Board establish-
ing the drain or its assessments in connection therewith must bring
his action promptly, and before the Board has either completed
delay) .235 To summarize these cases, it can well be said that an
the drain or incurred substantial obligations under the project.
Proof of fraud on the part of the Board would perhaps be the
232. Huckney v. Elliott, 23 N.D. 373, 137 N.W. 433 (1912).
233. Ross v. Prante, 17 N.D. 266, 115 N.W. 833 (1908).
234. 21 N.D. 232, 130, N.W. 836 (1911).
235. E.g., Barnes v. Cass County, 59 N.D. 135, 228 N.W. 839 (1929) ; Northern Pac. Ry.
v. Sargent County, 43 N.D. 156, 174 NW. 811 (1919) ; Alstad v. Sim, 15 N.D. 629, 109
N.W. 66 (1906).
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only means of overcoming the defense of laches.2 3 6 The legislature
has vested the drain board with broad quasi-judicial powers in
order that benefits may be assessed by the Board rather than
by a court of law. This is undoubtedly desirable from the standpoint
of qualifications. The drain board has greater experience and ex-
pertise in such matters than a court of law. The conclusiveness
of the Board's actions, however, has been under constant attack,2 37
but, as previously noted, plaintiffs have had little to complain
about in light of their own delays in seeking court review to the
extent it is available.
What questions may the court consider on appeal from an
order by the Board establishing the drain? The statute indicates
that the court may try the questions as to whether, in the first
instance, there was sufficient cause for making the petition, whether
the drain will cost more than the benefits expected, and whether




One case has indicated that the statutory language is permissive
rather than restrictive and that, consequently, the courts may deter-
mine other questions relating to the Board's actions as well.2 3 9
The case stands alone as authority for this proposition, however,
and its validity can be questioned, especially in light of other
statutory requirements.
2 40
As far as drainage projects in two or more counties or those
236. See also Bergen Township v. Nelson County, 33 N.D. 247, 156 N.W. 559 (1915);
and Turnquist v. Cass County Drain Commissioners, 11 N.D. 614, 92 N.W. 852 (1902).
237. And there Is a variety of opinion as to just how conclusive the Board's actions
should be. Consider, for example, the view of Justice Robinson dissenting in McHenry
County v. Brady, 37 N.D. 59, 84,.85, 163 N.W. 549-50 (1917):
It is high time for the Supreme judicial tribunal of this state to recon-
sider its errors and to place its decisions on a higher and better plane. In
this State the drainage statutes have been used to promote graft and job-
bery, with big fees and expenses for drain commissioners and their attor-
neys. The drainage laws and decisions have given a rich reward to jobbery
and oppressive litigation. In 11 N.D. reports, there are decisions in 14
drainage cases arising in Cass county, and in each case the sum total of
the drainage assessment was twice the benefits. In each case the legal fight
was a mere sham; it was a game with loaded dice. In the Erickson case,
11 N.D. 494, 92 N.W. 841, the total cost was $42,000, including $13,000 for
attorney's fees and commissioners' fees and junketing trips around the coun-
try. Bridges costing $500 or $600 were built for no possible use only to make
costs; bridges that have lain there to rot without any possibility of using
them. This Erickson Case has been a blind leader of the blind. It has no
support in reason or In the cases cited to sustain it. It is directly contrary
to the cases which are cited to sustain it.
As the drainage law was construed in the Erickson Case it is not con-
stitutional. It puts the citizen completely at the mercy of the drain com-
missioners, permitting them to fix the total amount of the assessment
against lands, including the charges of themselves and their attorneys and
friends, without giving any notice to the owner of the land. Under the law
of the land a person must have a fair hearing and a fair opportunity to
contest the sum total of all costs and plunder that drain commissioners may
charge against his land, and not merely a bootless opportunity to contest
the rate or per cent of the amount. The one may be clearly right, and the
other clearly outrageous.
238. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-18 (Supp. 1969). See Braaten v. Brenna, 63 N.W.2d 302
(N.D. 1954).
239. Chester v. Einarson, 76 N.D. 205, 34 N.W.2d 418 (1948).
240. See N.D. CsNT. ConE § 61-21-15 (Supp. 1969).
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that extend into Canada are concerned, the court has held that
an intercounty drain may be established on the basis of intracounty
petitions since the cooperation between county drain boards is joint,
but their actions are the individual actions of each county involved.2 41
Moreover, if the drain is to extend into Canada, the Board may
establish an outlet there and have excavation and other work per-
formed in that country. 242 The Canadian-American resolution adopted
to that effect did not invade the treaty-making power of the United
States Government.
2 4 3
Other cases have considered miscellaneous procedural aspects
of the drainange law. The case of Sim v. Rosholt2"4 held that the
jurisdiction of the Board could not be ousted by petitioners who
attempted to remove their names from the petition for establishment
of the drain after the Board had passed upon the sufficiency of
the petition, filed it, and proceeded to act thereunder.
The court held in Edwards v. Cass County245 that the failure
of the surveyor to file his report with the County Auditor was
not such an irregularity as would defeat the Board's action in
establishing a drain. The report was available at the office of
the drain board and the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the surveyor's
failure to file. Other defects not affecting the Board's jurisdiction
were that the notice of preliminary hearing on the establishment
of the drain did not contain the names of the signers of the petition,
one of the notices was not posted along the line of the drain,
and a deed to the right of way was not filed with the County
Auditor in advance of the apportionment of specific benefits by
percentages.
2 4 6
The Edwards case emphasizes, however, that the notice pro-
visions are mandatory. Such a minor noncompliance as existed
in the instant case would not defeat the Board's action, but the
case suggests that substantial compliance with the notice provisions
must be had in order to satisfy the due process requirements.
In the early case of State v. Nikkelson2 47 the court stated that,
in the absence of an authorizing statute, interest could not be
collected on delinquent drain assessments. If interest was paid
voluntarily, the money belonged to the drain fund and not to the
county.
If the drain is to run through more than one township, the
petition for establishing the drain must be signed by representa-
241. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Sargent County, 43 N.D. 156, 174 N.W. 811 (1919).
242. Freeman v. Trlmble, 21 N.D. 1, 129 N.W. 83 (1910), two justices dissenting.
248. McHenry County v. Brady, 37 N.D. 59, 163 N.W. 540 (1917).
244. Sim v. Roshult, 16 N.D. 77, 112 N.W. 50 (1907).
245. Edwards v. Cass County, 23 N.D. 555, 137 N.W. 580 (1912).
246. Id.
247. State v. Nikkelson, 24 N.D. 175, 139 N.W. 525 (1912).
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tives from each township.248 Moreover, the Board's determination
that a sufficient number of landowners have signed the petition
is not conclusive, and the court may review the Board's action
in this respect.
249
The Board can assess a railroad for benefits received, and
enforce the collection of the assessment by foreclosing the lien
created thereby over the railroad's objection that to do so would
be an unlawful interference with interstate commerce. 250 Further,
a railroad can be enjoined from maintaining an obstruction in
the form of bridge pilings over a drainage ditch.
251
Even if a drain is abandoned, the Board must pay the costs
incurred before abandonment. 252 If it were otherwise, an engineer,
surveyor, or contractor would perform needed services at a con-
siderable risk that such services would not be paid for in the
event the drain should later be abandoned. To pay all lawful charges
incurred prior to abandonment, a levy may be imposed on land-
owners who were to have benefited by the abandoned drain.
25
In Lee v. Thorenson,254 the court stated that the Board was
properly qualified even though the individual Board members did
not file the oath within the time required by statute. The important
fact was that the Board did not take any action until the oaths
were filed. Therefore, the court held that the Board was properly
constituted.
In summary, one can say that the decisions rendered are not
entirely reliable since, in all instances, the applicable statutory
provisions must be carefully compared. Many of the decisions are
based on statutes that have been subsequently revised in scope
and meaning. Hence, those decisions have little value today. The
latest drainage decision of the court is dated 1954.255 Since that
time, there have been extensive statutory changes, including the
comprehensive revision of the drainage law in 1955.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has explored in some measure the North Dakota
common law relating to drainage and a portion of the institutional
law. The institutional law discussion has focused on Drain Board
248. State ex rel. Bale v. Morrison, 24 N.D. 568, 140 N.W. 707 (1913).
249. Stoltze v. Sheridan, 28 N.D. 194, 148 N.W. 1 (1914).
250. Northern Pac, Ry. v. Richland County, 28 N.D. 172, 148 N.W. 545 (1914).
251. See State v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 28 N.D. 621, 150 N.W. 463 (1914).
252. Walstad v. Dawson, 64 N.D. 333, 252 N.W. 64 (1934).
253. Id.
254. Lee v. Thorenson, 65 N.W.2d 675 (N.D. 1954).
255. The more recent case of Brenna v. HJelle, 161 N.W.2d 356 (N.D. 1968), deals with
the obligation of the state highway department to pay for culverts and bridges necessary
when drains go through highways, under N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-21-32 (1960), in view of
the existence of Article 56 of the Amendments to the North Dakota Constitution. That
question is beyond the scope of this article.
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projects, while recognizing that other local authorities may also
sponsor drainage projects. It has not explored in any depth the
role of the State Water Commission in drainage. No particular
issue has been explored in great depth; the purpose of this article
was to present enough material to get a reasonable overview of
the area. After the survey of Water Management District law is
concluded, in depth research can be done on selected topics; for
example, what should be the role of the State Water Commission,
should the work of the individual districts be coordinated?
The flexible common law and the institutional approach work
hand in hand. The risk of liability for private drainage projects
that may harm another's land may well force more would-be drainers
to explore the institutional approach to draining. Perhaps the in-
stitution could get several differing parties to agree on how drainage
should be carried out without having to exercise its drainage powers
by serving as a mediator.

